

Swine Emergency Disease Response Plan

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1.0 Introduction

The introduction of a highly contagious disease or a swine incident resulting from some type of all-hazards event in swine could have devastating effects on Colorado's swine industry. Limiting the scope of an outbreak is dependent on the early detection and rapid response to eradicate the disease. The Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDA) *Swine Emergency Disease Response Plan* provides the response actions that will be implemented by the CDA in collaboration with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) and swine industry partners to swiftly detect, control, and eradicate a disease outbreak in swine.

This plan provides the protocols and procedures necessary to minimize the impact of an outbreak in swine and will be applicable to any highly contagious or economically destructive disease that causes significant morbidity or mortality in swine.

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of the CDA *Swine Emergency Disease Response Plan* is to provide a framework to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to an outbreak of a highly contagious disease in swine within the State of Colorado. The goal of this plan is two-fold: to control and eradicate the disease on an infected premises as quickly as possible; and, to protect and maintain business continuity on unaffected premises during a disease outbreak.

Natural disasters may also cause devastation in the State's swine population requiring a similar response. Many of the protocols and procedures presented in this plan, such as disposal methods, will be applicable in a natural disaster event affecting swine. In such incidents, the *CDA Swine Emergency Disease Response Plan* may be used as a template to help ensure an effective response.

1.2 Situation

Nationally, Colorado ranks 16th in swine production and is home to over 800 swine operations. The state's swine inventory is currently valued at over \$63 million and is a portion of the economic base for several rural communities. The potential impact on Colorado's economy from a disease outbreak in the swine would be devastating. Such an event would be far reaching, affecting many different sectors beyond the farm including meat processors, distributors, and retailers.

1.3 Assumptions

- Response to an animal disease outbreak will begin at the local level.
- If an animal disease emergency occurs in Colorado's swine industry, the most probable means of discovery will be by swine producers, private practice veterinarians and / or trace information from an animal disease investigation in another state.
- Private veterinary practitioners will likely be the first responders to any animal disease outbreak.

- A veterinarian is required to immediately notify the State Veterinarian or the USDA Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) of any suspected animal disease emergency.
- An animal disease outbreak may occur through natural pathways or could be introduced as an act of terrorism.
- Diagnosis of a highly contagious disease in Colorado, the United States or surrounding countries may significantly restrict the intrastate, interstate and international movement of animals (especially livestock) and animal products.
- Initiation and implementation of response actions for a suspected or confirmed foreign animal disease (FAD) will be under the jurisdiction of the CDA and carried out by the State Veterinarian or official designee. Producer input will be highly valued and integrated into the response.
- The State Veterinarian and the USDA APHIS AVIC will work in close coordination in any animal health emergency. There are established protocols for investigating and reporting potential FADs and new and emerging infectious animal diseases.
- Response measures for an animal disease emergency may involve the mutual aid support from sister counties and municipalities as well as local private industry support.
- Animal disease emergencies may lead to prolonged economic impacts requiring long term federal and state assistance programs for recovery.
- Owners losing livestock in an animal disease emergency or persons responding to the situation may require psychological counseling and support.

1.4 Plan Maintenance

The State Veterinarian is responsible for the management and maintenance of this plan, under the jurisdiction of the Colorado Agricultural Commission and the Commissioner of Agriculture or his designee. The CDA *Swine Emergency Disease Response Plan* will be reviewed and updated as required but at least annually in September to incorporate updates to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 9 – *Defense of United States Agriculture and Food*, Emergency Support Function (ESF) 11– *Agriculture and Natural Resources* and legislative updates as well as lessons learned that are identified in the debriefing process and after action reports following an actual event or training exercise.

2.0 Concept of Operations

The concept of operations provides the operational framework for activating this plan and how the CDA will classify the response. Additionally, this section provides an overview of the CDA’s responder health and safety program and guidance on how the Department will interface with other agencies, the livestock industry, media and the public during an emergency response.

2.1 Animal Diseases Significant to Swine

Animal diseases found in swine vary in virulence, ease of transmission, mode of transmission, and host affinity. Diseases of concern are highly contagious diseases that cause significant morbidity or mortality in swine. Such diseases often present similar clinical signs as diseases

that do not result in a high level of morbidity or mortality requiring diagnostic testing to determine the specific disease agent. Upon diagnosis, if the disease identified is not considered highly contagious it will be managed within normal business operations, management, and best production practices.

Animal diseases likely to cause high morbidity and mortality in swine and trigger activation of this plan are FADs and new and emerging diseases. A list of FADs that swine are susceptible to is provided in Appendix B. Additional information on disease transmission, vaccine availability and recommended control measures for listed FADs can also be found in Appendix B.

Animal diseases of concern are commonly categorized in the following manner.

- **Foreign Animal Disease** or exotic animal disease is defined as an important transmissible disease of livestock believed to be absent from the United States and its territories.
- **New or Emerging Diseases** are completely new diseases, or an old disease occurring in new places with new presentations, or newly resistant to available treatments.
- **OIE List of Reportable Diseases** is a unified list of reportable diseases maintained by The World Organization for Animal Health, once known as the Office of Internationale des Epizooties (OIE). For several years, the OIE created two lists (A and B) with different reporting obligations. In January of 2005, the lists were combined to form a single list with over 130 diseases of interest. Four criteria were used to develop the disease list: international spread, zoonotic potential, significant spread within a naïve population, and emerging diseases.
- **CDC Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases** are biological agents that are rarely seen in the United States. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) prioritizes these agents into A, B & C categories. **Category A** agents and disease are easily transmitted from person to person, have a high mortality rate and have the potential for a major public health impact. **Category B** agents and disease are moderately easy to disseminate and result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates. **Category C** agents and diseases include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination.
- **Zoonotic** diseases can be transmitted from animals to humans and /or humans to animals. According to the CDC, approximately 75% of recently emerging infectious diseases affecting humans are diseases of animal origin.

2.2 Colorado Reportable Disease of Swine

An additional animal disease category is the Colorado Reportable Disease List. A Colorado reportable disease is defined by Colorado Revised Statutes CRS 35-50-103 as infectious or contagious disease or emerging disease of livestock that pose a significant risk to the livestock industry of the state resulting from infectious agents, such as viruses, rickettsia, bacteria, fungi, protozoa, internal or external parasites, or prions, or any reportable disease or emerging communicable disease that is capable of being transmitted from one animal to another animal or

to a human, whether communicated directly or indirectly through an intermediate plant or livestock host, vector or the environment. Colorado Reportable Diseases of Swine are listed below.

- Anthrax
- Brucellosis
- Pseudorabies
- Rabies
- Salmonella
- Vesicular Stomatitis
- Vesicular Diseases of all livestock
- All infectious disease or parasite of livestock not previously known to exist in Colorado
- Any disease of unusual morbidity or mortality that does not fit the normal expected clinical picture.
- Any Suspected FAD

2.3 Incident Command System & Response Levels

Since incidents will vary in size and scope, the level of activation will depend on the nature of the outbreak. Not all swine disease incidents will require emergency response functions. Many incidents are handled routinely by private practice veterinarians and/or veterinarians employed by the State Veterinarian or APHIS Veterinarian Medical Officer (VMO). The swine industry has also invested time and resources in developing plans to deal with their own livestock incidents and situations.

In the event of a highly contagious disease outbreak in swine, the CDA will manage the incident using the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS provides standardized incident management processes, protocols and procedures for all emergency responders. CDA will also manage each incident using the Incident Command System (ICS), as mandated by NIMS. Designed to be a flexible all-hazard incident management system, ICS allows decision makers to fill ICS positions to meet the complexities and demands of the incident. For example, a localized disease event may only require the incident commander position to be filled; where as a regional or more wide-spread disease outbreak may require all positions in an ICS incident organization chart to be filled. See Appendix C for an ICS incident organization chart designed for an animal disease outbreak.

CDA will also follow NIMS incident typing and will respond to an animal health emergency using the following activation levels. NIMS incident typing will assist decision makers in determining resources required for specific incidents. Table 1 CDA Response Levels & National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Typing System summarizes level of response, lead agencies, and NIMS protocol for each level of response.

2.3.1 Level 5 Response

A level 5 response refers to a situation with little complexity that could be managed with one or two single resources. This level of response would be of a short duration and would consist of one 12-hour operational period or less.

2.3.2 Level 4 Response

A level 4 response is normally limited to one 12-hour operational period and requires minor state resources to manage the incident. This level of response does not require an incident action plan (IAP) and can be managed using the resources and personnel of the CDA Animal Industry Division. Level 4 activities will include those identified for Level 5 and also the following additions:

- Elevated animal origin verifications.
- Notification of private practice veterinarians of specific clinical symptoms of the disease(s) in question.
- USDA AVIC is notified of situation.
- Review of the *Swine Emergency Disease Response Plan* relative to a potential response to the disease in question.
- Notification of swine industry representative(s) of the disease outbreak and clinical symptoms.

2.3.3 Level 3 Response

A level 3 response reflects the elevated surveillance, preparation and limited response that may be initiated by the state if there is a presumptive positive or confirmed diagnosis of a FAD in Colorado. A level 3 response may trigger activation of the Colorado Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and deployment of the Eastern Colorado Incident Management Team (ECIMT).

The ECIMT is a Type 3 incident management team (IMT) that will be activated to support incident management for incidents that exceed departmental capability to manage the incident effectively. Type 3 IMTs are deployed as a team of 10-20 trained personnel to manage major and/or complex incidents requiring a significant number of local, regional, and state resources. A level 3 response may evolve into multiple operational periods that require a written IAP for each operational period. Level 3 activities will include those activities identified for all preceding levels and also the following:

- Importation of animals affected or from potentially affected areas or possibly all animals from the impacted states will be suspended, pending control and eradication of the disease.
- Relevant state resources will be inventoried and contract mechanisms supporting the logistics portion of a potential response will be reviewed and made ready for use.
- Public relations material will be reviewed, made current and vetted with key collaborators in preparation for release. CDA and APHIS will be consulted for their

message map on the appropriate disease, its implications for public health, animal health, trade and economic impacts upon the livestock industry.

2.3.4 Level 2 Response

A level 2 response reflects a full-scale multi-state response that may require regional and / or national resources to effectively manage the incident. Level 2 activation is in response to a large, complex incident that will involve multiple operational periods. A written IAP is required for each operational period. A Rocky Mountain Type II or equivalent IMT may be deployed to support management of the incident. A Type 2 IMT is deployed as a team of 20-35 to manage incidents of regional significance and other incidents requiring a large number of local, regional, state, and national resources.

2.3.5 Level 1 Response

A level 1 response will be declared for the most complex incidents that require national resources to safely and effectively manage the incident. A level 1 response will be managed by a Type 1 IMT. A Type 1 IMT is deployed as a team of 35-50 to manage large national incidents and other incidents requiring a large number of local, regional, state, national, and federal resources over multiple operational periods.

2.4 Incident Complexity Analysis

The exact moment when an incident shifts from one level of complexity to the next is often a matter of perception. The State Veterinarian / Commissioner or designees must assess the complexity of an incident and authorize a level of response to meet the needs of the event. An Incident Complexity Analysis may be completed to assist in determining the appropriate level of response. The assessment tool consists of a series of questions regarding the incident and associated information that when answered will help determine the appropriate level of response and resources required to meet the needs of an incident. An example of an Incident Complexity Analysis worksheet is located in Appendix D.

Table 1. Response Levels and National Incident Management System Incident (NIMS) Typing¹

| Response Level | NIMS Incident Type | Lead Agency | Emergency Response Actions* | Source of Resources |
|--|--------------------|--|--|--|
| Level 5 – Local Response (Local veterinarian & Producer) | Type 5 | CO Dept of Ag | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One 12hr. Operational Period - Incident action plan (IAP) not required* - State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) not activated - Incident Commander position staffed | - Local |
| Level 4 – County Response | Type 4 | CO Dept of Ag | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One 12hr. Operational Period - Incident action plan not required* - Emergency Operations Center not activated - Incident Command System(ICS) command and general positions activated as needed | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local - CDA Animal Industry Division |
| Level 3 – State Response | Type 3 | CO Dept of Ag | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - May extend into multiple operational periods - IAP may be required* - ICS some/all command and general positions activated - Eastern Colorado Incident Management Team will manage incident - State EOC may be activated | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local (Support) - State - May require regional resources |
| Level 2 – Multi-State Response | Type 2 | Joint Command National and regional coordination required | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Extends into multiple operational periods - IAP required - ICS some/all command and general positions activated - Rocky Mountain Type II Incident Management Team (IMT) will managed the incident - State EOC activated | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local (Support) - State - Regional - May require national resources |
| Level 1 – National Response | Type 1 | Unified National Command | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Extends into multiple operational periods - IAP required for each operational periods - ICS all command and general positions activated - Type I IMT will manage incident - State EOC activated | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local (Support) - State - Regional - National |

* IAPs are required for all HAZMAT incidents regardless of the type of incident.

¹ Based on the Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, 2009

For all incidents triggering activation of this plan, the Public Information Officer(s) will be Industry’s contact for information on the incident.

2.5 Responder Health and Safety Program

A fundamental responsibility of CDA is ensuring the safety of Department employees involved in responding to a disease outbreak. To meet this obligation, the CDA Homeland Security Director developed the responder health and safety program. The CDA Responder Health and Safety Program is composed of three components: (1) Personal Protective Equipment *GUIDELINES* for CDA Employees – General Guidance Document; (2) CDA – Respiratory Protection Program; and (3) Medical Monitoring and Rehabilitation. Combined, these documents / programs provide a means to assess employee fitness for emergency work, provide for personal health protection via the use of protective equipment and decontamination procedures and monitor vital signs and provide support to assure employees maintain fitness levels needed to conduct assigned activities.

2.5.1 Personal Protective Equipment

This General Guidance Document provides a plan to be followed to assure a safe working environment while allowing flexibility to meet varying needs that might be expected in a livestock emergency environment. The guidance is just that, guidelines that incident commanders, operations section chiefs, Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) veterinarians, team or task force leaders or the like can utilize in assessing and deciding upon equipment and procedures they will utilize when conducting their assigned missions. See Appendix E for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) guidance for zoonotic and non-zoonotic diseases.

Producers or the general public need to realize rather high levels of protection may be utilized initially as the agent at that point may be unknown. Once the agent is identified, levels of protection can be adjusted, generally decreased, to fit specific challenges an agent might pose. It is likely the latter level will be quite similar to employer placed biosecurity programs.

Of special note is the fact Colorado is a “non-Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)” state. This means state employees are not subject to the same regulations as are production facilities and their respective employees. The CDA program has essentially been placed to close this gap. Even so, producers remain responsible to follow appropriate OSHA programs related to their facilities. State employees can not provide any equipment or certain training to private employees though they may recommend certain levels of PPE be utilized for different operational activities.

2.5.2 Respiratory Protection Program

Whereas disease agents often utilize the respiratory system as a portal of entry and further where the use of chemicals in cleaning and disinfection or those that are inherently present on livestock operations may pose health risks, the department operates a respiratory protection program. Individuals who may be deployed to an incident have completed a medical questionnaire that has been reviewed and approved by a medical doctor familiar with such programs. These individuals have been trained and fit tested to utilize specific respiratory equipment. Production facilities may or may not have similar programs in place. It is anticipated if they do not, employees could

still work in less hazardous areas or accommodations could be made to have employees trained and tested for such activity.

2.5.3 Medical Monitoring and Rehabilitation

Individuals who work in emergency response will attest to the hard work often in adverse environments and long hours needed to complete tasks that must be done. In so doing, individuals can place themselves at risk for underlying problems that can lead to debilitating injuries or even death such as a preexisting cardiac issue leading to a heart attack under physical stress. In addition, physical exertion can lead to dehydration or exacerbation of environmental factors such as heat or cold conditions. Medical monitoring affords an opportunity to identify underlying problems and hopefully mitigate them before they become quite serious. Such monitoring occurs when risks exist and is conducted both prior to assignment and throughout the assigned work period. Rehabilitation periods are scheduled to allow responders a break in which to rest, rehydrate and get something to eat if need be.

Production workers generally have scheduled breaks to eat or get something to drink. These may need to be extended and rehydration beverages or food provided dependent upon work schedules. Medical monitoring of production employees might possibly be arranged for via local public health or emergency medical service departments.

2.6 Communication Plan

External communication during an outbreak will be the responsibility of the State Veterinarian and the CDA Director of Communications. The State Veterinarian, with assistance from the CDA Liaison Officer will direct and maintain communication with federal, state, and local government agencies and partners that have a statutory responsibility in emergency response (see Appendix F for the regulatory network's contact information). Additionally, the CDA Communication Director will communicate and collaborate with industry representatives throughout the incident.

Correspondence and communication with the media and public regarding the incident will be directed and managed by the CDA Director of Communications. The CDA Director of Communications will assume the ICS role of Public Information Officer (PIO) upon activation of this plan. In the event the ECIMT is called to manage the incident, the CDA PIO shall work in collaboration with the ECIMT PIO(s).

3.0 Disease Outbreak Response

This section describes the processes and protocols utilized by the CDA during a swine disease outbreak. These processes and protocols are designed to enable execution of the responsibilities of the CDA and to integrate federal, state, local, and industry efforts into an effective and coordinated approach to a disease outbreak in swine. Responding to a disease outbreak in swine will involve the following actions. A description and timeline of each action phase follows.

- **Disease Detection** -- Investigate Suspected Animal Disease and Initiate Preliminary Movement Restrictions
- **Disease Control** -- Quarantine Infected and Exposed Premises and Control Movement of Animals
- **Surveillance** -- Develop Surveillance Plan based on Epidemiological Investigation
- **Epidemiology** -- Determine the Extent of the Outbreak and/or Confirm Non-Infected Premises
- **Stabilization** -- Control, Prevent Spread of, and, as Possible, Eradicate Disease

- **Business Continuity** -- Protect Economic Viability and Continuity of Operations
- **Recovery** -- Return Affected Premises to Normal Business Operations

Table 2. Timeline for Disease Control Response Activities¹

| Disease Outbreak Response Actions* † | 12 hours Within a confirmed positive case | 24 Hours Within a confirmed positive case | 48 Hours Within a confirmed positive case | 24 Hours Within determination of need | 72 Hours Within determination of need |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Disease Control -- Quarantine Infected and Exposed Premises and Control Movement of Animals | | | | | |
| Mobilize livestock disease-related incident command personal. | | | | | |
| Establish initial control areas. | | | | | |
| Enhance biosecurity procedures on infected, contact and susceptible premises. | | | | | |
| Establish quarantine zones for infected and contacted premises and/ or broader movement restrictions. | | | | | |
| Surveillance -- Develop Surveillance Plan Based on Epidemiological Investigation | | | | | |
| Develop a surveillance plan and implement existing diagnostic support. | | | | | |
| Epidemiology -- Determine the Extent of the Outbreak and / Or Confirmed Non-Infected Status | | | | | |
| Implement epidemiological surveillance and diagnostic support plan in at-risk species and notify other states of trace-outs. | | | | | |
| Stabilization -- Control, Prevent Spread of, and, as Possible, Eradicate Disease | | | | | |
| Begin treatment, inoculation, and /or depopulation of animals at identified site. | | | | | |
| Begin decontamination and disposal procedures at identified site. | | | | | |
| Business Continuity -- Protect Economic Viability and Continuity of Operations | | | | | |
| Implement procedures for the creation of bio-secure transportation corridors to market or other key facilities for disease –free goods and animals. | | | | | |
| Develop procedures for managing contaminated products. | | | | | |
| Establish storage and /or disposal areas for animals or products stopped in transit. | | | | | |
| ¹ Based on Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. <i>Livestock and Poultry Disease Emergencies Capability</i> , August 2009. * Disease Detection and Recovery Actions are not in the scope of the above timeline. † Communication with neighboring states will be initiated within 4 hours of a confirmed positive case. | | | | | |

4.0 Disease Detection – Investigate Suspected Animal Disease and Initiate Preliminary Animal Movement Restrictions

4.1 Foreign Animal Disease Investigation

Upon notification of a suspected case of a FAD, the Colorado State Veterinarian or USDA AVIC will dispatch a FADD to conduct a Foreign Animal Disease Investigation (FADI). See Appendix G for VMO territories in Colorado. The investigation is conducted using a standardized format

developed by USDA. Information and data collected during the FADI includes a general assessment, gathering site information and samples, and epidemiological data (see Appendix H for an example of a FADI Data Collection Form). In addition, the FADD collects the following information about the facility:

- Premises Identification Number (PIN)
- Type of facility
- Plat map description
- GPS Coordinates
- Type and number of livestock
- Recent livestock movement
- Number of personnel or employees

The goal of the investigation is to confirm or rule out the presence of disease in a rapid and efficient manner. As such, the FADD examines the animals on site and packages the appropriate diagnostic samples for delivery to a state and federal diagnostic laboratory (see the Colorado Animal Emergency Response Organization (CO AREO) for Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs). Information from the investigation is reported to the State Veterinarian who in consultation with the FADD and the AVIC determines the potential for the presence of an animal disease is “unlikely”, “potential” or “highly” likely”. This decision is critical and determines turnaround times on diagnostic samples and aids in establishing appropriate disease control measures. The priority established will determine where the samples are sent and how they are handled for transportation, and the level of response the lab gives the samples. Operations in the collection, shipping and management of laboratory samples shall be in accordance with the USDA Memo 580.4.

In most cases, preliminary results are available within 24 hours. However, during the investigation, the State Veterinarian may implement certain movement restrictions for swine and swine products. Decisions relative to movement controls would be based on the general clinical assessment, morbidity and mortality of the disease outbreak and the risk to other animal facilities. A description of zones, areas and premises used for restricting movement is located in Section 4.2.

4.2 Hold Order

There are three possible outcomes of an FADI: negative, presumptive positive, or confirmed positive. In the event a FAD is suspected as the initial outcome of the FADI, the State Veterinarian may issue a hold order as authorized by CRS 35-50-103 to restrict animal movement. CRS 35-50-103 defines a hold order as a temporary order issued by the state veterinarian when an infectious disease is suspected in livestock to isolate any specific livestock premises, county, district; and specify sanitary measures, pending completion of testing. The State Veterinarian may authorize the hold order through accredited veterinarians or through another appointed official.

4.3 Quarantine

A preliminary / presumptive positive test result must be confirmed by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL). Once the appropriate NVSL lab has verified the testing results are a confirmed positive, the State Veterinarian as the Commissioner of Agriculture's designee may place the infected premises under quarantine. CRS 35-50-103 defines quarantine as "an order issued by the commissioner when testing has confirmed the presence of an infectious or contagious disease in livestock, which order isolates specific livestock, premises, counties, districts, or sections of the state; restricts the movement of livestock; and specifies sanitary measures."

4.4 Response Plan Activation Sequence

The activation of an emergency plan is at the discretion of the State Veterinarian. Upon confirmation from the Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory of a presumptive positive or from NVSL of a presumptive or positive to a highly contagious animal disease the State Veterinarian will activate the *Swine Emergency Disease Response Plan*.

The State Veterinarian will immediately contact the Commissioner of Agriculture, Deputy Commissioner, the USDA APHIS VS Colorado AVIC, and the CDA Homeland Security Director and relay all known information on the positive test notification. The State Veterinarian should be prepared to make recommendations with respect to any gubernatorial declarations and/or activation of the state EOC (SEOC) and appropriate level of response. Specifically, the State Veterinarian will relay the following information:

- Name and contact information of the verifying laboratory official reporting the confirmatory test
Name and location of the infected premises(es) including Global Positioning System (GPS) and Colorado Livestock Security System (CLSS) Premises Identification Number (PIN) if available.
- Type of production facility(ies) and number of swine on the infected premises(es).

If notification of a presumptive positive or NVSL confirmed positive of a highly contagious animal disease is after normal working hours, on a weekend or holiday, the State Veterinarian will communicate with the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, the AVIC, and the CDA Homeland Security Director at their afterhours contact numbers. Based on direction from the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and AVIC, the State Veterinarian will take appropriate action to activate the response at a level based on incident type –see Table 1.

5.0 Disease Containment -- Quarantine Infected and Exposed Premises and Control Movement of Animals

Upon confirmation of a suspected or confirmed case of a highly infectious animal disease, the State Veterinarian will implement a series of response actions to control the spread of disease and minimize the impact of an outbreak. Though actions will vary based on the disease agent,

the following section presents a series of possible control activities that may be utilized to contain a highly infectious disease in swine.

5.1 Movement Restrictions

Movement restrictions for swine, swine products, vehicles and possibly people may be used to prevent the further spread of disease. Once an outbreak has been confirmed, the Infected Premises will be placed under quarantine (see Section 4.3 for additional information on livestock quarantines). Diseased or disease exposed animals will need to remain on the premises until the necessary control measures are determined by the State Veterinarian. A control zone, which includes any contact premises (farms or areas with a connection to the Infected Premises), will be established. Road blocks and/or check points and possibly decontamination stations may be needed at ingress and egress locations in the control zone. Additional zones may be designated to control and monitor the disease. Descriptions and a diagram of Premises, Zones and Area designations follow.

5.2 Premises, Zones and Area Designations

The designation of Control Areas and Zones is essential to successful quarantine and movement control activities. The State Veterinarian shall determine premises classification in the event of a presumptive positive or confirmed case of a highly contagious swine disease. He/she shall work with the AVIC and FADD veterinarians, emergency responder teams, and the SEOC to establish area and zone designations that will allow for the identification, implementation and enforcement of quarantine and movement controls.

Control Area – The Control Area consists of the Infected Zone, a Buffer-Surveillance Zone, and when vaccination is used, a Buffer Vaccination Zone.

Buffer Vaccination Zone – Emergency vaccination (if available) may be used to slow the spread of the highly contagious animal disease. The area where vaccination is being – or has been – practiced will be known as the Buffer Vaccination Zone.

Buffer Surveillance Zone – The Buffer Surveillance Zone immediately surrounds both the Infected Zone and if established, the Buffer Vaccination Zone.

Infected Zone – The Infected Zone encompasses the perimeter of all suspect and infected premises. The Infected Zone also includes contact premises as required by the situation.

Surveillance Zone – The Surveillance Zone is established within the Free Zone, along its border with the Buffer-Surveillance within a Control Area. Surveillance in the Surveillance Zone will focus on premises determined to be at the highest risk of infection.


At-Risk Premises – Premises within the Buffer-Surveillance Zone that have clinically normal susceptible swine are known as At-Risk Premises. Surveillance on the At-Risk Premises will be appropriate to detect the presence and/or to prove the absence of the disease on the premises.

Contact Premises – Contact premises are those premises with susceptible animals that have been determined to have been exposed directly or indirectly the FAD agent, but on which a highly contagious FAD has not been diagnosed.

Infected Premises – Infected premises are premises with the presumed or confirmed animal disease based on clinical signs and/or laboratory results.

Suspect Premises – A suspect premises is a premises on which it is reasonable by virtue of clinical signs of illness, morbidity or mortality to believe that some risk of highly contagious swine disease may exist.

Figure 1. Premises, Zones and Area Designations



5.3 Biosecurity and Disease Control Measures

USDA APHIS defines biosecurity as the use of certain management practices designed to prevent the introduction and spread of disease. Also, biosecurity helps to mitigate the effects of the disease once it has been introduced into a herd or area. Biosecurity target areas for a swine facility are site security and traffic control, isolation of animals, and sanitation. Swine producers incorporate biosecurity measures into their daily operations as part of swine health and

management practices. Biosecurity measures for normal operations in swine facilities are located in Appendix K.

During a swine health emergency, the State Veterinarian may prescribe additional biosecurity measures for premises located in defined zones for each of the target areas. Biosecurity measures will be dependent upon the disease and its mode(s) of transmission.

5.3.1 Site Security

Any site that is under investigation as an infected premises, a suspect premises, or a contact premises shall take steps to prevent all non-essential traffic from entering the premises. All traffic should be prohibited unless directly involved in the care and feeding of swine or involved in the emergency response. Additional site security procedures that may be recommended include:

- Establish one ingress and one egress location into the facility. All other access points must be blocked or gates locked to prevent unregulated entry or exit from the facility. If possible, the ingress and egress location should be located on a level and solid surface with access to water (by hose or tanker truck) for cleaning and disinfection purposes. Vehicles transporting workers or supplies may need to park at the access gate and shuttle people and supplies in through a safe corridor system or transport on foot – exceptions would be large truck transport vehicles.
- All non-essential work on the farm shall cease and access to the facility will be restricted to essential personnel. Essential personnel are defined as having a direct role in the care of the animals or in response. All vehicles and equipment on the premises may be prohibited from leaving the premises unless approved by the State Veterinarian. Cleaning and disinfection will likely required of such vehicles.
- All essential personnel are required to wear PPE determined necessary to protect or prevent the spread of disease and to mitigate any zoonotic disease potential. Personnel entering the premises will be required to wear disposable or adequately cleaned and disinfected boots, coveralls, gloves, head/hair covering and possibly masks. The level of protection will be determined by the specific diseases, area and nature of work individuals are to engage in. These items must be put on prior to entry onto the premises and must be removed and thoroughly disinfected or disposed of prior to leaving.
- Verify premises log book is complete. Deliveries for farm essentials shall be by appointment only.

5.3.2 Cleaning & Disinfection Procedures

Cleaning and disinfection is a means to control the spread of disease by attempting to eliminate targeted disease causing microorganisms and prepare the premises for the reintroduction of livestock. Cleaning and disinfection procedures are essential both during and after an animal disease event. Cleaning and disinfection materials that should be available at designated

entry/exit point on the infected premises includes: brushes, buckets, hoses, water, disinfectant and a pressure washer. Cleaning and disinfection must be performed on all personnel, equipment, and vehicles leaving the infected premises or control area. A list of disinfectants approved by EPA for specific diseases is located in Appendix I. Specific Cleaning and disinfection procedures that may be required by the State Veterinarian include:

- Establishing a designated decontamination area / corridor on the premises. This is an area where personnel, vehicles, and equipment will undergo cleaning and decontamination before leaving the premises. This area should be close to the entry / exit point, on a hard surface and have access to water.
- Establishing a designated area for personnel to don and doff personal protective equipment and protocols for disposing of or treating contaminated personal protective equipment.
- Implementing a shower in/shower out policy for all essential personnel coming in direct contact with swine and areas where swine are housed.
- Establishing a pest, especially rodent, control program.

5.3.3 Wildlife Management

If an animal disease outbreak has potential wildlife impacts or can be spread by wildlife, the Colorado Division of Wildlife (DOW) will collaborate and lead all appropriate wildlife response activities. Appendix J provides additional information on the DOW role in an animal disease outbreak. Two important questions to ask would be: “Are there sick wildlife?” and “/or can wildlife carry this disease to another premises?”

5.3.4 Public Health Involvement

If an animal disease outbreak is identified as a zoonotic disease and has potential public health impacts, the State Veterinarian or the CDA will contact the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) to seek assistance in the response to protect the public’s health. Appendix J provides additional information on the CDPHE’s role in an animal disease outbreak. An important question to ask would be “Are there sick people?” If so, CDPHE will be involved with their epidemiological investigation.

6.0 Surveillance -- Develop Surveillance Plan Based on Epidemiological Investigation

Animal disease surveillance activities involve collecting and interpreting data from animal populations to determine their health status regarding diseases of concern. Surveillance programs are currently in place to assist in rapid detection of an animal disease incursion. Surveillance techniques are also used in an animal disease response to determine the extent of a disease known to be present, and during the recovery phase of a response to provide the necessary evidence for the elimination of the disease.

Surveillance methods that may be used during a disease outbreak include inspecting animals for clinical signs of the disease and clinical testing. Inspection of animals for clinical signs involves observing animals for any clinical presentation of the disease. For example, swine infected with

African Swine Fever show signs of a high fever, decreased appetite, and red blotchy skin. Surveillance information is also obtained through the collection and testing of animal blood (serological testing), tissue, or skin scrapings. The speed at which these actions occur will have a direct effect on the extent and thus the outcome of an outbreak. Once control areas, zones and premises are identified, a surveillance plan for each area or zone will be developed by the State Veterinarian. The surveillance plan will include information on methods to collect, manage, and analyze animal health data. Since each animal disease outbreak is unique, the surveillance plan will be tailored to the disease agent. OIE surveillance recommendations for animal diseases are located in Appendix B.

7.0 Epidemiology -- Determine the Extent of the Outbreak and / or Confirm Non-Infected Status

To respond quickly and effectively to an animal disease event, the CDA animal health officials need to know which animals are involved, where they are located, and what other animals might have been exposed. The sooner reliable data is available, affected animals can be located, appropriate response measures can be established, and disease spread can be halted.

Thus, an important component of an animal disease outbreak investigation is to establish trace-forward and trace-backs from premises to determine both the source of the disease and the risk for disease transmission to other premises with susceptible species. Trace-backs are conducted to assist in identifying the source of the virus and to help determine how the disease was introduced to the facility. Trace-back procedures include collecting information from producers on the origins of all swine (and possibly other animals), swine products, feed, equipment and vehicles, (livestock trucks, feed trucks, veterinary trucks) and people (sales and feed representatives, visitors and veterinarians) that have visited the farm prior to the outbreak. Trace-backs are usually applied for a minimum of 2 times the maximum incubation period before the onset of clinical signs.

Trace-forward procedures gather similar information on animal, people, and equipment movements off the farm to identify other premises that possibly received infected animals, animal products or contaminated equipment. Trace-forward is usually applied up to the time quarantine is imposed. OIE tracing recommendations for FADs significant to swine are located in Appendix B.

It is recommended that producers maintain herd records on a regular basis to assist in both trace-forward and trace-back procedures when needed. Additionally, it may be required that producers participate in an animal identification system. Descriptions of two programs available to Colorado swine producers follow.

7.1 Colorado Livestock Security System

The Colorado Livestock Security System (CLSS) is currently under development by the CDA. The CLSS is a repository of Colorado livestock ownership data that can be accessed and utilized

during an animal disease outbreak to assist in the tracing of animals and premises. Data for the CLSS are pulled from existing data sources and integrated into one system that can be accessed by CDA animal health officials during an animal emergency. CLSS enables CDA to inform producers quickly when a disease event may impact their area or the species of animals they have.

7.2 Commercial Swine Operations & Traceability

According to APHIS, about 95 percent of pork is produced by operations under contract with packing companies, and 80 percent is produced by commercially integrated businesses. Often, large numbers of swine move in groups to different production units within the same management system prior to harvest. Such factors contribute to a high level of traceability within the commercial swine industry. Such contracts and business arrangements could be utilized to identify ownership and location of swine as well as their movement.

8.0 Stabilization -- Control, Prevent Spread of, and as Possible, Eradicate Animal Disease

Elimination, if possible, of a highly contagious disease involves a series of activities that will be implemented by the State Veterinarian in collaboration with the USDA AVIC. Actions taken will be based on the particular circumstances of the outbreak including: the disease agent, epidemiology of the disease, vaccine availability and resource availability. Descriptions of possible response actions to eliminate an animal disease are described in the following section.

8.1 Appraisal & Indemnity

According to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 9CFR53.3 a percentage of fair market value will be paid to the owners for livestock that must be depopulated or materials that must be destroyed to prevent the spread of an animal disease.

Additionally, CRS 35-50-113 grants the CDA Commissioner the authority under certain circumstances and upon the recommendation of the State Veterinarian, to authorize the payment of indemnity to any livestock owner whose herd is depopulated due to exposure or diagnosis with an infectious or contagious disease.

With qualifying events, appraisal and indemnification process outlined in 9CFR53.3 is the most efficient appraisal process for livestock owners. The process outlined in CRS 35-50-113 is a cumbersome and often time-consuming procedure used in situations where depopulation of livestock is deemed necessary by the Commissioner and the State Veterinarian. For both processes, valuation of livestock must be mutually agreed upon by the owner and state or federal official prior to depopulation. Under certain situations this may require physical appraisal of livestock.

In previous highly infectious disease outbreaks, the cost of euthanasia, carcass disposal and decontamination were paid for by the USDA. Colorado will follow USDA procedures to request assistance with indemnification of swine producers in response to an eligible disease event.

8.2 Depopulation

CRS 35-50-113 authorizes the State Veterinarian to order euthanasia, mass depopulation and carcass disposal to mitigate an animal disease in Colorado and is an integral part of a comprehensive response plan. In the event that a highly contagious animal disease in swine is confirmed in the state of Colorado, swine depopulation and carcass disposal may represent the most effective means of disease control and eradication. If deemed necessary by the State Veterinarian to contain a disease outbreak, the CDA will take every measure to ensure rapid and humane depopulation of all swine affected by the disease outbreak. The State Veterinarian will develop a comprehensive depopulation and disposal plan based on guidance from the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) Guidelines on Euthanasia, National Agriculture Biosecurity Center, Kansas State University, or other resources. The State Veterinarian's depopulation plan will be dependent upon the type of swine to be depopulated and the numbers of swine to be depopulated. Table 3. Methods of Depopulation Appropriate for Swine provides an overview of the approved methods of depopulation for swine, it is broken out by the size of the animals involved. Table 4. Considerations for Approved Depopulation Methods for Swine provides an overview of the advantages ,disadvantages and considerations for human safety for depopulation methods appropriate for swine. Carcass disposal will be carried out in collaboration with the CDPHE Solid and Hazardous Waste Program as defined in the CDA/CDPHE joint Interagency Agreement (IA) state statute, and state rule/regulations. Additional information on carcass disposal is located in Section 8.3.

8.2.1 Carbon Dioxide Gas

Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) gas is an acceptable agent for euthanasia for swine. CO₂ replaces oxygen in the body and causes rapid onset of anesthesia with subsequent death due to respiratory arrest.

8.2.2 Penetrating Captive Bolt

The AVMA has approved the penetrating captive bolt as a possible form of euthanasia for swine. This is a gun like device that is placed against the skull of the animal and when fired a rod (bolt) in the gun is forced into the skull and into the brain tissue. The rod is attached to the gun and taken out when the skull is penetrated. This is usually fatal, but it is strongly recommended that an adjunct measure be administered to ensure death. This method is practical for numerous animals, and is especially useful for animals over 200 pounds.

8.2.3 Blunt Trauma

Blunt Trauma is a quick, firm blow to the top of the head over the brain. Blunt Trauma is only effective for suckling piglets because their skull bones are thin enough for the force to cause depression of the central nervous system and cessation of brain function.

Table 3. Methods of Depopulation Appropriate for Swine¹

| | Farrowing Pig Less than 3 Wks Up to 12 lbs or 5.5 kg | Nursery Pig Less than 10 wks Up to 70 lbs or 32kg | Grower Pig Less than 150 lbs or 68 kg | Finisher Pig Greater than 150 lbs or 68 kg | Mature Sow or Boar |
|--|---|--|--|---|------------------------------|
| Carbon Dioxide | Yes | Yes | Not Practical | Not Practical | Not Practical |
| Gunshot | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Penetrating Captive Bolt | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Blunt Trauma | Yes | No | No | No | No |
| Electrocution (Head to Heart) | Yes for pigs over 10 lbs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Anesthetic Overdose | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

¹ National Pork Board, *On-Farm Euthanasia of Swine, Recommendations for the Producers*, 2008

² American Association of Swine Veterinarians & National Pork Board, *On-Farm Euthanasia of Swine –Options for the Producers*, No Date

8.2.4 Gunshot

Gunshot to the brain is an AVMA approved method to euthanize swine. The caliber, projectile, and propellant load should be appropriate for the species. Full metal jacket ammunition should never be used. Muzzle energy charts should be used to determine the appropriate caliber and type of ammunition for the type of animal. Appropriate muzzle energy is three hundred foot-pounds of force for animals up to 400 pounds and 1000 foot-pounds of force for animals over 400 pounds.

8.2.5 Electrocution

This is a two-step process that passes electricity through the brain and stuns the animal. The second step passes electricity through the body and stops the heart. This method is very dangerous to personnel, requires special equipment, and an electrically safe environment in which to conduct such activity.

8.2.6 Anesthetic Overdose

Barbiturates and pentobarbital combinations are used to depress the central nervous system, causing deep anesthesia that progresses to respiratory and cardiac arrest. This method is considered to be very humane but it does require intravenous injection into the animal.

Table 4. Considerations for Approved Depopulation Methods for Swine^{1,2,3}

| Depopulation Method | Human Safety Risk | Advantages | Disadvantages | Equipment |
|--------------------------|--|---|--|---|
| Carbon Dioxide | - Gases present potential hazardous aspects for humans | - Non-invasive - No tissue or blood exposure - Minimizes stress | - Only practical for small pigs - Requires excellent ventilation systems to disseminate gas after ventilation systems to | - Suitable Chamber - Compress CO ₂ |
| Gun Shot | Bullet poses considerable risk | Recommended for animals that cannot be restrained or are difficult to handle. | - May not kill animal - May present biosecurity risk from leaking body fluids - May preclude evaluation of brain if damaged by shooting | - Skilled and licensed operator - appropriate firearm and ammunition for swine |
| Blunt Trauma | Low | - Only applicable to small pigs | - Only practical for small pigs | |
| Penetrating Captive Bolt | Moderate | - Safer for operator than free bullet method - Reduces the need to move animals | - May be a two-step process based on pig size - Misplaced captive bolt Gun may compromise Animal welfare - Captive bolt gun must be maintained, cleaned - Several must be used to reduce over heating | - Different sizes of captive bolt guns for different size swine. |
| Electrocution | High – requires considerable operator knowledge | - No tissue or blood exposure - physically demanding for operator - Requires monitoring to ensure | - Restrain is necessary - Two-step process for large animals | - Electrical supply - Electrodes |
| Anesthetic Overdose | Low | - Humane & rapid killing of animals | - Animals must be restrained - Administered by a trained professional - Limited access to drugs | - Syringes & needles - Drug to be injected |

1 National Pork Board, *On-Farm Euthanasia of Swine, Recommendations for the Producers*, 2008

2 American Association of Swine Veterinarians & National Pork Board, *On-Farm Euthanasia of Swine –Options for the Producers*, No Date

3 United States Animal Health Association, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases. *Foreign Animal Diseases*, 2008

8.3 Disposal

An essential component in eradicating a disease outbreak is the proper disposal of livestock carcasses. The goal of carcass disposal is to facilitate the decomposition of carcasses and the destruction of any pathogenic disease agent present. Methods utilized should limit the potential for the spread of the disease or exposure of susceptible species to disease and limit any potential adverse environmental impact. Commonly used disposal methods include: burial, composting, incineration, alkaline digestion and rendering. When applicable, swine carcasses will be disposed of on the infected premises to limit the potential spread of disease. However, factors such as the number, size and species of livestock, the location of the infected premises, the soil types and groundwater locations, and the particular disease agent will determine the most appropriate method of carcass disposal. The State Veterinarian will collaborate with the AVIC and the CDPHE Solid and Hazardous Waste Program to determine the location and type of disposal method. Possible methods of carcass disposal are outlined below. Additional information on each option is located in Table 5. Swine Disposal Methods: Considerations.

8.3.1 Rendering

Rendering is a process of both physical and chemical transformation resulting in three end products, carcass meal, melted fat, and water. The main carcass rendering processes include size reduction followed by cooking and separation of fat, water, and protein materials. The resulting carcass meal can often be used as an animal feed ingredient.

8.3.2 Composting

Composting involves a phased decomposition of animal carcasses over a period of time. The process involves the breakdown of organic materials by microorganisms such as bacteria and fungi which results in the release of heat, water, CO₂ and other gases. The process can be complex and requires an appropriate site, proper management and a carbon source such as, wood chips, straw, cornstalks or similar products.

Windrow composting technique takes place in a static pile. The site is usually built in open spaces with no walls or roofs and not protected from weather. Windrow composting is often used for disposal of large animals.

Bin composting is the simplest form of a contained composting method, where carcasses and composting material are confined within a structure built from any materials that are structurally adequate to confine the compost pile material.

8.3.3 On-Site Burial

Burial of deceased livestock can take place onsite or in an approved landfill. Both burial methods are subjected to Code of Colorado Regulation (CCR) 6 1007 Parts 2-3, which lists the following requirements:

- Every part of all dead animals must be buried by at least two feet of soil.
- No dead animals shall be placed in any body of water or seasonal creek or pond.

- Surface water should be diverted from the pit utilizing an up gradient diversion berm or other method.
- All dead animals must be buried at least 150 feet down gradient from any groundwater supply source.
- In no case should the bottom of the burial pit be closer than five feet to the ground water table.
- Burial sites must be located more than one mile from any residence.

8.3.4 Landfill Burial

The use of permitted landfills for carcass and material disposal may be an option. The necessary equipment, personnel, procedures and containment systems are already in place. Transport of the carcasses to the landfill can pose some risk of disease spread.

8.3.5 Incineration

There are three broad categories of incineration: open-air, fixed facility, and air-curtain. Open air includes burning carcasses in an open field. Examples of fixed facilities are crematoria, small carcass incinerators at veterinary colleges, large waste incineration plants, on-site incinerators, and power plants. Air-curtain incineration involves a machine that fan-forces a mass of air through a manifold that accelerates the incineration process generally conducted in an earthen trench. Air-curtain incineration has been used in Colorado to dispose of animals infected with a prion causing chronic wasting disease.

8.3.6 Alkaline Hydrolysis

Alkaline Hydrolysis is a process that uses a caustic agent, such as sodium hydroxide and heat to hydrolyze carcasses into a sterile solution and calcium products. The process requires expensive equipment and provides only low volume capacity; therefore, this method has limited application in a disease outbreak situation.

Table 5. Swine Disposal Methods: Considerations^{1,2}

| Disposal Method | Advantages | Disadvantages | Required Resources |
|--|--|---|--|
| Mass Burial On Site | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Removal of large amounts of biomass -- Facilities can be decontaminated immediately upon removal of livestock -- Risk of disease spreading is reduced upon burial of livestock. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- May serve as a containment site rather than decomposing livestock -- Requires multi-agency approval -- Significant Site Planning -- Economically Costly -- Public Opposition -- Potential environmental contamination | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Excavation Equipment -- Cover material -- Appropriate landscape |
| Composting | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Removal of large amounts of biomass -- Produces a humus-like product containing nutrients and organic matter that can be recycled onto cropland -- Cost effective | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Slow carcass decay -- Poor odor retention -- Leachate production | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Carbon Source ie- sawdust, straw, corn stover -- Appropriate composting site -- Tractor or Skid Loader -- Long stem dial-type composting thermometer |
| Incineration Fixed Facility | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Biosecure | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Fixed capacity -- Public Opposition -- Expensive to operate -- Incinerators are incapable of handling large volumes of carcasses | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Fuel -- Incineration facility |
| Air-Curtain | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Mobile | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Fuel intensive -- Logistically challenging | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Fuel -- Air-curtain incineration facility |
| Alkaline Hydrolysis | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- combine sterilization and digestion into one process -- reduction of waste volume and weight by as much 97% -- Complete destruction of pathogens including Prions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Currently limited capacity for destruction of large volumes of carcasses in US -- Potential issues regarding disposal of effluent | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Insulated, steam – jacketed stainless steel pressure vessel -- sodium hydroxide or potassium hydroxide -- water, energy for steam generation |
| Rendering | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Good biosecurity at rendering plants -- High Rendering Temperatures destroy disease pathogens | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Requires transporting carcasses off-site -- Cost of Transportation to rendering plant -- Biosecurity concerns over rendering trucks going farm-to-farm. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Rendering Plant |

¹ National Agricultural Biosecurity Center, Kansas State University, *Carcass Disposal: A Comprehensive Review* 2004

² Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, *Swine Carcass Disposal Options for Routine and Catastrophic Mortality* 2008

8.4 Alternatives to Depopulation

In most disease outbreaks, depopulation will be the primary method utilized to stop transmission and spread of the disease agent within affected animals on diseased premises. However, under certain circumstances, additional methods may need to be implemented to achieve full eradication of the disease or when stamping out is not possible. At this point, alternatives such as vaccination and controlled animal movements may be implemented by the State Veterinarian in collaboration with the AVIC.

8.4.1 Vaccination

Vaccination is a tool that can be utilized in conjunction with other emergency management controls to alleviate a disease outbreak. Policy frameworks for the use of vaccines during an outbreak include:

- Using vaccines as a primary disease control strategy without stamping out.
- Using vaccines in conjunction with a stamping out strategy to assist in eliminating a disease agent.
- Using vaccines during a long-term campaign to eradicate a well established disease.
- Not using a vaccine in disease response efforts due to: 1) unavailability; 2) does not meet safety standards; and, 3) additional reasons involving trade and marketing.

New technology in vaccine development has resulted in some ‘marker’ vaccines. This type of vaccine allows, via serological testing, animal health officials to distinguish vaccinated animals from naturally infected animals. Such a distinction is critical when providing proof to world animal health organizations which regulate disease free status that has implications for world trade of livestock and livestock products.

8.4.2 Vaccination Strategies


Vaccines can be utilized for different purposes during an animal health emergency. Strategies for vaccine use are described below.

A suppressive vaccination strategy is used as a disease control measure to reduce the viral shedding of livestock that have been exposed to the disease agent. This type of strategy is more commonly used in situations of intensive farming, usually due to resource constraints, such as constraints on carcass disposal.

A preventive vaccination strategy is used for high- risk animals not included in the control area but in close proximity to the infected premises to be considered at risk for exposure. This strategy is an alternative to the traditional stamping-out policy. Numerous factors should be considered prior to implementing this strategy such as: acceptance of vaccine internationally and the effectiveness of the vaccine. A preventive vaccination is also an option for threatened or endangered species that may be considered at risk due to exposure the disease agent.


A **barrier vaccination** policy can be used to implement a preventive vaccination strategy. This policy is based on a spatial pattern developed to create a barrier between the infected premises and at risk premises. The intent of a barrier vaccination is to inhibit the disease transmission rate by vaccinating all suspected livestock. Common types of vaccination barriers are illustrated below. The area of the barrier will be dependent upon the epidemiology of the pathogen, livestock density, and available resources-see Figure 2. Barrier Vaccination Examples.

Figure 2. Barrier Vaccination Examples



A **targeted vaccination** policy can also be used preemptively. The targeted vaccination is commonly used to vaccinate livestock in facilities with a high animal density. Swine facilities that house all phases of production would be a possible location for a target vaccination. These facilities would be considered high risk and if infected would amplify the transmission of the disease agent. Targeted vaccination may also be used to protect threaten and endangered species see Figure 3. Targeted and Area Vaccination Diagram.

Figure 3. Targeted and Area Vaccination Diagram



Area or Blanketed Vaccination also known as a mass vaccination entails vaccinating all livestock within a delineated geographical area. The defined area may be an isolated area, a large region or state. Often area vaccinations are used when traditional stamping out methods are not meeting disease control objectives (see Figure 3. Targeted and Area Vaccination Diagram).

8.4.3 National Veterinary Stockpile

The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) is the Nation's repository of vaccines and other critical veterinary supplies and equipment. The NVS is designed to augment state and local resources in the fight against dangerous animal diseases that could potentially devastate American agriculture, seriously affect the economy, and threaten the public's health. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) established the NVS in 2004. The Directive requires APHIS to be able to deploy the NVS to the site of a dangerous animal disease outbreak within 24 hours. To accomplish this critical mandate, the NVS defined agents of greatest interest to animal health and has prioritized its resources accordingly. The NVS currently holds or has systems in place to provide:

- Personal protective equipment (PPE) for 310 responders for 10 days in a high-risk environment.
- Further PPE to protect 3,000 responders for 40 days
- Anti-viral medications for 3,000 responders for 6 weeks
- Satellite data and voice equipment that is portable and capable of establishing temporary command posts.

9.0 Business Continuity -- Protect Economic Viability and Continuity of Operations

Maintaining business continuity and the movement of livestock that are unaffected by a disease outbreak is a critical component of the CDA *Swine Emergency Disease Response Plan*. The movement of livestock and animal food products will be at the discretion of the State Veterinarian in collaboration with the USDA AVIC and will be based on the epidemiology of the disease agent. Guidance on the movement of swine and swine products during a disease outbreak is described in Sections 9.1 and 9.2.

9.1 Controlled Animal Movement

During a disease outbreak, the State Veterinarian may issue an official permit for movement of swine and swine products and other livestock that would allow their movement from a premises or geographic area within a quarantine order. Permits to move swine from premises to premises within a control area can be issued if the following criteria are met. Types of permits that maybe authorized are listed below.

- No swine or other livestock on that premises have shown clinical signs of the disease agent for a determined amount of days and disease free status has been verified within 24 hours prior to movement.

- No susceptible species were added to the premises of origin for an appropriate amount of time as determined by the State Veterinarian.
- The premises of origin is not an infected premises, contact premises, or suspect premises and there is no detectable evidence of the disease agent.
- Transport conveyances for swine and swine product meet acceptable biosecurity standards.

9.1.1 Movement to Slaughter within a Control Area

Permits to move to slaughter (for human food use) or processing can be issued if (a) the swine or swine products meet the requirements of USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service for food use; and (b) the livestock or products are eligible for a permit for movement from premises to premises or for movement directly to slaughter.

9.1.2 Movement Out of an Infected Zone

No susceptible livestock species or products posing a potential risk of disease transmission may leave the infected zone unless they are going directly to slaughter at an approved slaughter facility established in the buffer surveillance zone or meet the criteria described on a permit. No materials posing risk of disease transmission may leave the infected zone except by permit.

9.1.3 Movement within an Infected Zone

During the initial phase of an incident, swine should not be allowed to move within an infected zone except at the discretion of the State Veterinarian.

9.1.4 Movement within the Buffer Surveillance Zone

Susceptible animal species or products posing a potential risk, may be moved within the buffer surveillance zone under permit if they are known not to be infected with or exposed to the disease agent and animals and show no signs of other communicable diseases.

9.1.5 Movement Out of the Buffer Surveillance Zone

Susceptible animal species or products may be allowed to leave the control area if a risk assessment deems such movement to be appropriate. Movement will require a permit as prescribed by the State Veterinarian.

9.1.6 Movement of Non-Susceptible Livestock

Movement of non-susceptible livestock out of the control area requires a permit as prescribed by the State Veterinarian.

9.2 Bio-secure Transportation Corridors

As mentioned, allowing unaffected animals and animal food products to move during an animal disease outbreak is essential to maintaining industry business continuity. Thus, movement of swine and other livestock that are deemed disease-free will take place along bio-secure corridors. Bio-secure corridors are transportation routes located outside of the quarantine area that will allow livestock and animal food products to travel safely without risk of exposure to an animal disease. Identifying bio-secure corridors will be the responsibility of the CDA with assistance from the Colorado State Patrol and local law enforcement agencies.

10.0 Recovery -- Returning Affected Premises to Normal Business Operations

The actions taken during the recovery period are focused on restoring the operation to normal or near normal as quickly as possible. Issues to consider are repopulation of production facilities, financial considerations, re-establishing public trust and consumer confidence, and review of risk reduction measures. It is important to note that the recovery phase of an incident may last an extended period of time.

10.1 Surveillance and Monitoring

Once the mandatory down time requirements are met, serologically negative sentinel hogs may be introduced to determine if pathogens are still present and viable. Sentinel hogs may be retained for at least two specific pathogen incubation periods (to be determined by the State Veterinarian) and monitored for clinical signs of the disease. In the event that a sentinel hog becomes infected or tests serologically positive for the disease, the sentinel will be depopulated and the cleaning and disinfection process will be repeated.

10.2 Restocking

Once all premises affected by the outbreak are cleaned and disinfected and there are no new reports of the disease agent, restocking will be permitted by the State Veterinarian. A moratorium on restocking will be in place for a minimum of 30 days or other appropriate time period determined by the State Veterinarian after depopulation and after the completion of an approved cleaning and disinfection process of the entire premises. OIE recommendations for restocking by disease agent are listed in Appendix B.

11.0 Roles and Responsibilities

Sections 11.1 and 11.2 outline the roles and responsibilities of agencies and producers when responding to an animal disease outbreak.

11.1 Agencies Roles and Responsibilities

Responding to an outbreak of a highly contagious animal disease outbreak will require the coordination of multiple agencies. A list of local, state, and federal agencies and their possible role in an outbreak response are listed in Appendix J.

11.2 Industry's Role in a Disease Outbreak

Industry will play an important role both in preventing a disease outbreak and in response to such an event. Appendix K offers recommendations and actions to improve Continuity of Operations plans for the swine industry.

Appendices

A List of Acronyms

B Animal Diseases Significant to Swine

C ICS Incident Organization Chart for Animal Disease Response

D Incident Complexity Analysis Worksheet

E PPE Guidelines for Zoonotic and Non-Zoonotic Diseases

F Regulatory Communication Network

G Colorado VMO Territories

H FADI Collection Data Form Sample

I EPA Approved Disinfectants for Highly Pathogenic Diseases

J Local, State, and Federal Agencies Roles and Responsibilities

K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

Appendix A Acronyms

| | | | |
|-----------------|--|-------|--|
| APHIS | Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service | FADDL | Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Lab |
| AVIC | Area Veterinarian in Charge | FADI | Foreign Animal Disease Investigation |
| AVMA | American Veterinary Medical Association | FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| CCR | Code of Colorado Regulations | FDA | Food and Drug Agency |
| CDA | Colorado Department of Agriculture | FSIS | Food Safety Inspection Service |
| CDC | Centers for Disease Control and Prevention | GPS | Global Positioning System |
| CDEM | Colorado Department of Emergency Management | HSPD | Homeland Security Presidential Directive |
| CDPHE | Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment | IA | Interagency Agreement |
| CDOT | Colorado Department of Transportation | IAP | Incident Action Plan |
| CFR | Code of Federal Regulations | ICS | Incident Command System |
| CIAC | Colorado Information Analysis Center | IMT | Incident Management Team |
| CLSS | Colorado Livestock Security System | JTTF | Joint Terrorism Task Force (within FBI) |
| CO ₂ | Carbon Dioxide | MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| CO AREO | Colorado Animal Emergency Response Organization | NIMS | National Incident Management System |
| CRS | Colorado Revised Statutes | NVSL | National Veterinary Service Laboratories |
| CSP | Colorado Safety Patrol | OIE | Office of Internationale des Epizooties |
| CSU | Colorado State University | OSHA | Occupational Safety and Health Association |
| CVMB | College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences | PIN | Premises Identification Number |
| DOW | Division of Wildlife | PIO | Public Information Officer |
| ECIMT | Eastern Colorado Incident Management Team | PPE | Personal Protective Equipment |
| EOC | Emergency Operation Center | SEOC | State Emergency Operations Center |
| EPA | Environmental Protection Agency | USDA | United States Department of |
| ESF | Emergency Support Function | VMO | Veterinarian Medical Officer |
| FAD | Foreign Animal Disease | | |
| FADD | Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician | | |

Appendix B Animal Diseases Significant to Swine

| Animal Diseases Significant to Swine -- Table I | | | |
|---|---|--|---|
| Animal Disease / Classification ^{1,2,3} | Mode of Transmission ¹ | Recommended Quarantine and Movement Controls ^{2,4} | Treatment Options and Vaccine Availability ^{2,3} |
| African Swine Fever Foreign Animal Disease OIE Reportable Disease | Aerosol (limited) Direct Contact - Swine-to-Swine - Ingesting infected product - Semen (negligible) Fomites Vectors - Ticks | - Infected Premises 1.8 miles (3 km) , Suspected Premises and Control Area should be defined - 6.2 miles (10 km) between buffer between Control Area and Free Zones - No movement of animals, animal products, or feed | - No vaccine available - The treatment of infected animals is not effective - Depopulation of all infected pigs - Widespread testing, elimination of all Seropositive swine |
| Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera) Foreign Animal Disease OIE Reportable Disease | Aerosol (limited) Direct Contact - Swine-to-Swine - Semen (negligible) Oral - Ingesting infected product Fomites Vectors - Flies - Mosquito Cats, Dogs can spread disease | - Infected Premises 1.8 miles (3 km) , Suspected Premises and Control Area should be defined - 6.2 miles (10 km) between buffer between Control Area and Free Zones - No movement of animals, animal products, or feed | - Depopulation of all infected swine and in contact swine, (some documents recommend slaughter of complete herd). - Vaccine is available |
| Foot and Mouth Disease Foreign Animal Disease OIE Reportable Disease | Aerosol Direct Contact - Swine-to-Swine - Semen (negligible) Oral - Ingesting infected product Fomites | - Strict quarantine controls - Infected premises zone should extend a minimum of 6.2 miles (10km) beyond the presumptive or confirmed infected premises. | - Depopulation of all infected and in contact animals - Vaccine is available, must be repeated in Intervals - Barrier or ring vaccination is recommended with stamping out infected and at risk swine |
| Rinderpest Foreign Animal Disease OIE Reportable Disease | Aerosol (limited) Direct Contact - Swine-to-Swine - Semen Oral - Ingesting infected product - Fomites (limited) | - 6.2 miles (10 km) between buffer between Control Area and Free Zones | - Depopulation of all infected and in contact animals - Vaccine is available, must be repeated in intervals - Barrier or ring vaccination is recommended with stamping out infected and at risk swine |

1 Center for Food Security and Public Health, Iowa State University, *Animal Disease Index*, 2008

2 The World Organization for Animal Health, *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, 2008. http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_sommaire.htm

3 AUSVETPLAN Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, Disease Strategies, <http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/aahc/programs/eadp/ausvetplan/disease-strategies.cfm>

4 United States Animal Health Association, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases. *Foreign Animal Diseases*, 2008

Appendix B Animal Diseases Significant to Swine

| Animal Diseases Significant to Swine -- Table II | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|--|
| Animal Disease / Classification | Tracing / Recommendations ^{2,3} | Decontamination Recommendations ^{1,2} (See Appendix I for Approved Disinfectants) | Restocking / Surveillance Recommendations ^{3,4} | Wildlife / Vector Control ³ |
| African Swine Fever Foreign Animal Disease OIE Type A List | - Trace backs should extend a minimum of 20 days from first appearance of clinical signs | - C & D all vehicles entering and leaving premises - C & D all clothing and boots - Cook all garbage and meat products fed to pigs - Control ticks with acaricides | - Sentinel swine restocked 60 days after decontamination - Surveillance of sentinel animals for six weeks – serology and clinical examinations | Feral Pigs, Ticks |
| Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera) Foreign Animal Disease OIE Type A List | - Trace-backs minimum of 11 days from first appearance of clinical signs | - C & D all vehicles entering and leaving premises - C & D all clothing and boots - Cook all garbage and meat products fed to pigs | - Sentinel swine restocked 21 days after decontamination | N/A |
| Foot and Mouth Disease Foreign Animal Disease OIE Type A List | - Trace-backs minimum of 14 days from first appearance of clinical signs - Trace-forward 21 days before first case to quarantine | - C & D all vehicles entering and leaving premises - C & D all clothing and boots - Cook all garbage and meat products fed to pigs | - Sentinel swine restocked 30 days after decontamination, contact with all parts of premises and objects. Inspected by Vet every 3 days. - Sentinel swine maintained on Premises for 60 days | Rodent controls , Feral Pigs |
| Rinderpest Foreign Animal Disease OIE Reportable Disease | - Trace-backs minimum of 21 days from first appearance of clinical signs - Trace-forward 21 days before first case to quarantine | - C & D all vehicles entering and leaving premises - C & D all clothing and boots - Cook all garbage and meat products fed to pigs | - Sentinel swine restocked 15 days after decontamination - Surveillance of sentinel animals weekly for 28 days | N/A |


1 Center for Food Security and Public Health, Iowa State University, *Animal Disease Index*, 2008

2 The World Organization for Animal Health, *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, 2008. http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_sommaire.htm

3 AUSVETPLAN Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, Disease Strategies, <http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/aahc/programs/ealp/ausvetplan/disease-strategies.cfm>

4 United States Animal Health Association, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases. *Foreign Animal Diseases*, 2008

**Appendix C
CDA ICS Organization Chart for Animal Emergency Response**



* Denotes positions to be filled by ECIMT members when the incident's complexity exceeds CDA's capability to manage the incident effectively. Additional positions may be filled ECIMT as the complexity of an incident increases.

Appendix D Incident Complexity Analysis Worksheet

| All-Hazard Incident Complexity Analysis | | |
|---|--------------|---|
| Incident Name: | Date: |  |
| Incident Number: | Time: | |
| This Complexity Analysis is weighed based on the relevance to Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, and Property Conservation. | | |
| Complexity Factors | | Check if Pertinent |
| Impacts to Life, Property, and the Economy | | |
| Urban interface; structures, developments, recreational facilities, or potential for evacuation. | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Community and Responder Safety | | |
| Performance of public safety resources affected by cumulative fatigue | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Overhead overextended mentally and/or physically | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Communication ineffective with tactical resources or dispatch | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Incident action plans, briefings, etc. missing or poorly prepared | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Resources unfamiliar with local conditions and tactics | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Potential Hazardous Materials | | |
| Potential of Hazardous Materials | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Weather and other Environmental Influences | | |
| Unique natural resources, special-designation areas, critical municipal watershed, protected species habitat, cultural value sites | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Likelihood of Cascading Events | | |
| Variety of specialized operations, support personnel or equipment | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Potential Crime Scene (including Terrorism) | | |
| Potential crime scene | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Potential of terrorism | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Political Sensitivity, External Influences, and Media Relations | | |
| Sensitive political concerns, media involvement, or controversial policy issues | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Organizational Performance Values and Product Development | | |
| Non-IAP Products not being developed or deficient. | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Area Involved, Jurisdictional Boundaries | | |
| Incident threatening more than one jurisdiction and potential for unified command with different conflicting management objectives. | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Availability of Resources | | |
| Operations are at the limit of span of control. | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Unable to property staff air operations. | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Limited local resources available for initial attack/response | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Heavy commitment of local resources to logistical support. | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Existing forces worked 12 hours without success. | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Percentage Score | | % |
| If 10% or lower look at going to or staying at Type 4 Team. | | |
| If 10 % to 20% maintain or go to Type 3 Team | | |
| If greater than 20% increase to Type 2 Team or additional overhead | | |
| Prepared By | Date: | Time: |

Appendix E PPE Guidelines for Zoonotic and Non-Zoonotic Diseases

| Personal Protective Equipment Guidelines for Colorado Department of Agriculture Employees | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--------|---|-----|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|---------------------|---|--------|
| Environment | Zoonotic Disease not Diagnosed in the U.S. | | Zoonotic Disease Diagnosed in the United States | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | Suspect Disease Outbreak Investigation | | | Confirmed Zoonotic Disease Diagnosis – Emergency Response Activities | | | | | | | | | | |
| Equipment | Routine Surveillance | | Suspect Disease Outbreak Investigation | | General Operations Areas Surveillance | | Near or Contact Premises Surveillance | | Biological Control Area Surveillance | | Biological Control Area Activity | | | | | |
| | | | | | Outdoor Environment | Indoor Environment | Outdoor Environment | Indoor Environment | Outdoor Environment | Indoor Environment | Indoor Depopulation Preparation | Indoor Depopulation Re-Entry CO2 & CO2 Level Testing | Routine Surveillance Operations | Outdoor Environment | Any Cleaning and/or Disinfection Activity | |
| Coveralls, Work Uniforms, etc. | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tyvek Coveralls | | X | X | | | X | | X | | X | | X | X | | | |
| Tychem Coveralls | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | X | X |
| Exam gloves (heavy Disposable) | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X plus | X plus | X plus | X plus | X plus | X plus | X plus |
| Rubber Gloves (heavy duty) | | | | | | | | | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| N-95 or N-100 Filtering Face piece* | | X | X | X | X plus | X | X | X plus | X plus | X plus | | | | | X plus | |
| Goggles (indirect vented)** | | | | +/- | X or | | +/- | X or | X or | X or | | | | | X or | |
| Full-face APR with N-100 Canister | | | | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X |
| Self-contained breathing apparatus SCBA | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | |
| Boot Covers (Disposable) | +/- OR | +/- OR | +/- OR | | | +/- OR | +/- OR | | | | | | | | | |
| Rubber Boots | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

* Examples of zoonotic disease with higher transmission risk would include influenza in swine or other non-avian species, anthrax, plague and tularemia, among others.

** A separate table has been developed for avian influenza. See HPAI PPE Guidelines.

Appendix E PPE Guidelines for Zoonotic and Non-Zoonotic Diseases

**Personal Protective Equipment Guidelines for Colorado Department of Agriculture Employees
Non- Zoonotic Animal Disease Incident**

| Personal Protective Equipment Guidelines for Colorado Department of Agriculture Employees Non- Zoonotic Animal Disease Incident | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------------|
| Environment | Suspect Disease not Diagnosed in the U.S. | | Suspect Disease Diagnosed in the United States | | | | | | | |
| | | | Suspect Disease Outbreak Investigation | Confirmed Diagnosis of Suspect Disease – Emergency Response Activities | | | | | Biological Control Area Activity | |
| Equipment | Routine Surveillance | Suspect Disease Outbreak Investigation | | General Operations Areas Surveillance | Near or Contact Premises Surveillance | Biological Control Area Surveillance | Indoor Depopulation Preparation | Indoor Depopulation Re-Entry CO2 & CO2 Level Testing | | |
| | | Routine Surveillance | Suspect Disease Outbreak Investigation | Routine Surveillance | Routine Surveillance Operations | Routine Surveillance Operations | Routine Surveillance Operations | Indoor Depopulation Preparation | Indoor Depopulation Re-Entry CO2 & CO2 Level Testing | Routine Surveillance Operations |
| Coveralls, Work Uniforms, etc. | X | | | | | | | | | |
| Tyvek Coveralls | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | |
| Tychem Coveralls | | | | | | | | | X | X |
| Exam gloves (heavy Disposable) | X | X | X | X | X | X plus | X plus | X plus | X plus | X plus |
| Rubber Glovers (heavy duty) | | | | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| N-95 or N-100 Filtering Face piece* | | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X plus |
| Goggles (indirect vented)** | | | | | | | | | | X or |
| Full-face APR with N-100 Canister | | | | | | | | | | X |
| Self-contained breathing apparatus SCBA *** | | | | | | | | X | | +/- |
| Boot Covers (Disposable) | +/- OR | +/- OR | +/- OR | +/- OR | | | | | | |
| Rubber Boots | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

* Filtering face pieces are recommended to avoid transmission of a disease agent to other physical locations via the responders respiratory system as can occur with agents such as the Foot and Mouth virus.

**Goggles /full race piece maybe considered for dust control in any location /activity and should routinely be used in cleaning and disinfection activities.

*** SCBA should be used in altered environments such as gas euthanasia or ihigh risk confined space such as manure pits.

Appendix F Regulatory Communication Network

| County Emergency Managers of Colorado Current as of January 2011 | | | | |
|---|-------------------|------------------------|--------------|--|
| Colorado County | Emergency Manager | Phone Number (24-Hour) | Fax Number | Email |
| Adams | Heather McDermott | 720-322-1400 | 720-322-1404 | hmcdermott@co.adams.co.us |
| Alamosa | Pet Magee | 719-589-5807 | 719-587-0264 | pete_magee@qwestoffice.net |
| Arapahoe | Lt. Greg Palmer | 303-795-4711 | 720-874-4158 | GPalmer@co.arapahoe.co.us |
| Archuleta | Drew Petersen | 970-263-2131 | 970-731-4800 | dpetersen@archuletacounty.org |
| Baca | Riley Frazee | 719-523-4511 | 719-523-6584 | riley.frazee@seregion.com |
| Bent | Randy Freed | 719-456-1363 | 719-456-0476 | randyf@bentcounty.net |
| Boulder | Mike Chard | 303-441-4444 | 303-441-3884 | mchard@bouldercounty.org |
| Broomfield | Kent Davies | 303-438-6400 | 720-887-2001 | kdavies@ci.broomfield.co.us |
| Chaffee | Lisa Ortega | 719-539-2596 | 719-539-7442 | lortega@chaffeecounty.org |
| Cheyenne | Darcy Janssen | 719-767-5633 | 719-346-8542 | janssen@wildblue.net |
| Clear Creek | Kathleen Krebs | 303-679-2393 | 303-679-2440 | kkrebs@co.clear-creek.co.us |
| Conejos | Rodney King | 719-589-5804 | 719-376-5661 | rodneykk@hotmail.com |
| Costilla | Matthew Valdez | 719-672-3302 | 719-672-3003 | Mathew.Valdez@costillacounty.net |
| Crowley | Larry Reeves | 719-267-5555 x1 | 719-267-3114 | lreeves@crowleycounty.net |
| Custer | Christe Feldmann | 719-783-2270 | 719-783-9085 | ccoem@centurytel.com |
| Delta | Rob Fiedler | 303-640-9999 | 970-874-2014 | fiedler@deltacounty.com |
| Denver | Daniel Alexander | 303-640-9999 | 720-865-7691 | daniel.alexander@denvergov.org |
| Dolores | Todd Parisi | 970-677-2500 | 970-677-2880 | dcoem@yahoo.com |
| Douglas | Fran Santagata | 303-660-7500 | 303-814-8790 | fsantagata@dcsheiff.net |
| Eagle | Barry Smith | 970-479-2201 | 970-328-8694 | barry.smith@eaglecounty.us |
| Elbert | LaRiea Thompson | 303-805-6131 | 303-805-6159 | LaRiea.Thompson@elbertcounty-co.gov |
| El Paso | Jim Reid | 719-390-5555 | 719-575-8591 | |
| Fremont | Steve Morrisey | 719-276-5555 | 719-276-7304 | steve.morrisey@fremontco.com |

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Appendix F Regulatory Communication Network

| County Emergency Managers of Colorado (Cont.) | | | | |
|---|----------------------|----------------------------|----------------|--|
| Current as of January 2011 | | | | |
| Colorado County | Emergency Manager | Phone Number (24-Hour) | Fax Number | Email |
| Garfield | Chris Bornholdt | 970-625-8095 | 970-945-6430 | cbornholdt@garfield-county.com |
| Gilpin | George Weidler | 303-582-5500 | | gweidler@co.gilpin.co.us |
| Grand | Trevor W. Denney | 970-887-2732 | | tddenney@co.grand.co.us |
| Gunnison | Scott Morrill | 970-641-8000 | 970-641-7693 | smorrill@gunnisoncounty.org |
| Hinsdale | Jerry Gray | 970-641-8000 | 970-944-2630 | grayj@lakecity.net |
| Huerfano | Diego A. Bobian | 719-989-8220 | | dbobian@huerfano.us |
| Jackson | Kent Crowder | 970-723-4242 | 970-723-4706 | |
| Jefferson | James (Tim) McSherry | 303-277-0211 | 303-271-4905 | jmcsherr@jeffco.co.us |
| Kiowa | Chris Sorensen | 719-438-5411 | 719-438-5503 | chris@kiowaoem.com |
| Kit Carson | Darcy Janssen | 719-346-8538 | 719-349-8542 | janssen@wildblue.net |
| Lake | Mike McHargue | 719-486-1249 | 719-486-0139 | mikemchargue@hotmail.com |
| La Plata | Butch Knowlton | 970-385-2900 | 970-382-6272 | knowltonbk@co.laplata.co.us |
| Larimer | Erik Nilsson | 970-416-1985 | 970-498-9203 | nilssoed@co.larimer.co.us |
| Las Animas | Bill Cordova | 719-846-2211 | 719-845-2598 | bcordova@amigo.net |
| Lincoln | Kenneth Morrison | 719-743-2426 | 719-743-2280 | ladmin@lincolncountyco.us |
| Logan | Bob Owens | 970-522-3512 | (970) 521-0632 | Owens@sterlingcolo.com |
| Mesa | Andrew Martsolf | 970-250-1279 | | andrew.martsolf@mesacounty.us |
| Mineral | William Fairchild | 719-658-2600 | 719-658-2764 | mincosheriff@centurytel.net |
| Moffat | Tom Soos | 970-824-6501 | 970-826-2423 | tom.soos@thmcraig.org |
| Montezuma | Doug Parker | 970-565-8441 | 970-565-3991 | dparker@so.montezuma.co.us |
| Montrose | Ike Holland | 970-252-4010 | 970-249-7761 | iholland@montrosecounty.net |
| Morgan | Steve Enfante | 970-867-8531 | 970-867-7344 | senfante@co.morgan.co.us |
| Otero | Chris Johnson | 719-384-5941 | 719-384-2272 | cjohnson@otero.gov |

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Appendix F Regulatory Communication Network

County Emergency Managers of Colorado (Cont.) Current as of January 2011

| Colorado County | Emergency Manager | Phone Number (24-Hour) | Fax Number | Email |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------|--|
| Ouray | Alan Staehle | 970-252-4020 | 970-325-0452 | awsouray@aol.com |
| Park | Brain Foltz | 719-836-4121 | 719-836-4156 | bfoltz@parkco.us |
| Phillips | Randy Schafer | 970-854-3144 | 970-854-3811 | rschafer@pctc.net |
| Pitkin | Ellen Anderson | 970-920-5300 | 970-920-5307 | ellena@co.pitkin.co.us |
| Prowers | Staffon Warn | 719-336-3977 | 719-336-4883 | staffon.warn@prowerscounty.net |
| Pueblo | Karen Ashcraft | 719-583-6250 | 719-583-6218 | ashcraft@co.pueblo.co.us |
| Rio Blanco | John Hutchins | 970-878-9620 | 970-878-3127 | rbcem@co.rio-blanco.co.us |
| Rio Grande | Todd Wright | 719-657-4000 | | rgcoem@riograndecounty.org |
| Routt | Bob Struble | 970-846-1552 | | bstruble@co.route.co.us |
| Saguache | Jim Felmlee | 719-655-2525 | | jfelmlee@amigo.net |
| San Juan | Kristina Maxfield | 970-387-5531 | 970-387-0251 | sanjcoem@yahoo.com |
| San Miguel | Jennifer Dinsmore | 970-728-1911 | 970-728-9206 | jenniferd@sanmiguelcounty.org |
| Sedgwick | Mark Turner | 970-474-3355 | 970-474-2607 | ptsports57@yahoo.com |
| Southern Ute Indian Tribe | Kathie Gurule | 970-563-4401 | 970-563-0215 | kgurule@southern-ute.nsn.us |
| Summit | Joel Cochran | 970-453-2232 ext 336 | 970-453-7329 | jcochran@co.summit.co.us |
| Teller | Steve Steed | 719-687-9652 | 719-687-1202 | steeds@co.teller.co.us |
| Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe | John Trocheck | 970-565-3706 | 970-564-5443 | Jtrocheck@utemountain.org |
| Washington | Mike McCaleb | 970-345-2244 | 970-345-2701 | mmccaleb@co.washington.co.us |
| Weld | Roy Rudisill | 970-304-4015 x2700 | 970-304-6543 | rudisill@co.weld.co.us |
| Yuma | Roger Brown | 970-848-0464 | 970-848-0160 | yumaoem@wycomm.org |

Colorado Department of Emergency Management. <http://www.dola.state.co.us/dem/localem.htm>. Jan 2011

Appendix F Regulatory Communication Network

| County Sheriffs of Colorado (Cont.) | | |
|--|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Current as of January 2011 | | |
| Colorado County | Sherriff | Phone Number |
| Adams | Doug Darr | 303-655-3216 |
| Alamosa | David Stong | 719-589-6608 |
| Arapahoe | J. Grayson Robinson | 720-874-4165 |
| Archuleta | Peter Gonzales | 970-264-2131 |
| Baca | David Campbell | 719-523-4511 |
| Bent | David Encinias | 719-456-0795 |
| Boulder | Joseph Pelle | 303-441-4605 |
| Broomfield* | Chief Tom Deland | 303-438-6400 |
| Chaffee | William Palmer Jr. | 719-539-2814 |
| Cheyenne | Ken Putman | 719-767-5633 |
| Clear Creek | Don Krueger | 303-569-3251 ext. 376 |
| Conejos | Robert Gurule | 719-376-2196 |
| Costilla | Amos Medina | 719-672-3302 |
| Crowley | Miles Clark | 719-267-5555 |
| Custer | Fred Jobe | 719-783-2270 |
| Delta | Fred McKee | 970-874-2000 |
| Denver* | Chief William Lovingier | 720-913-2000 |
| Dolores | Jerry Martin | 970-677-2257 |
| Douglas | David Weaver | 303-660-7541 |
| Eagle | Joseph D. Hoy | 970-328-6611 |
| Elbert | Shayne Heap | 303-621-2027 |
| El Paso | Terry Maketa | 719-520-7204 |
| Fremont | Jim Beicker | 719-276-5555 |
| Garfield | Lou Vallario | 970-945-0453 |

County Sheriffs of Colorado. <http://www.csoc.org/counties.asp>. Jan 2011

*Chief of Police for Bloomberg and Denver Counties

Appendix F Regulatory Communication Network

| County Sheriffs of Colorado (Cont.) | | |
|--|-----------------|---------------------|
| Current as of January 2011 | | |
| Colorado County | Sheriff | Phone Number |
| Gilpin | Bruce Hartman | 303-582-1060 |
| Grand | Rodney Johnson | 970-725-3344 |
| Gunnison | Rickard Bescker | 970-641-1113 |
| Hinsdale | Ronald Bruce | 970-944-2291 |
| Huerfano | Bruce Newman | 719-738-1600 |
| Jackson | Scott Fischer | 970-723-4242 |
| Jefferson | Ted Mink | 303-271-5305 |
| Kiowa | Forrest Frazee | 719-438-5306 |
| Kit Carson | Tom Ridnour | 719-346-8934 |
| Lake | Ed Holte | 719-486-1249 |
| La Plata | Duke Schirard | 970-247-1157 |
| Larimer | Justin Smith | 970-498-5100 |
| Las Animas | James Casias | 719-846-2211 |
| Lincoln | Tom Nestor | 719-743-2426 |
| Logan | Brett Powell | 970-522-2578 |
| Mesa | Stan Hilkey | 970-244-3500 |
| Mineral | Ronald Bruce | 719-658-2600 |
| Moffat | Tim Jantz | 970-824-4495 |
| Montezuma | Dennis Spruell | 970-565-8452 x303 |
| Montrose | Rick Dunlap | 970-249-6606 |
| Morgan | James E. Crone | 970-867-2461 |
| Otero | James Casias | 719-384-5941 |
| Ouray | Ronald Bruce | 970-325-7272 |
| Park | Fred Wegener | 719-836-2494 |
| Phillips | Charles Urbach | 970-854-3644 |

County Sheriffs of Colorado. <http://www.csoc.org/counties.asp>. Jan 2011

Appendix F Regulatory Communication Network

| County Sheriffs of Colorado (Cont.) | | |
|--|--------------------|---------------------|
| Current as of January 2011 | | |
| Colorado County | Sheriff | Phone Number |
| Pitkin | Joe Disalvo | 970-920-5300 |
| Prowers | James Faull | 719-336-8050 |
| Pueblo | Kirk Taylor | 719-583-6125 |
| Rio Blanco | Si H. Woodruff | 970-878-5023 |
| Routt | Garrett Wiggins | 970-879-1090 |
| Saguache | Mike Norris | 719-655-2544 |
| San Juan | Sue Kurtz | 970-728-4442 |
| Sedgwick | Randy Peck | 970-474-3355 |
| Summit | Sheriff John Minor | 970-453-2232 |
| Teller | Mike Ensminger | 719-687-9652 |
| Washington | Larry Kuntz | 970-345-2244 |
| Weld | John Cooke | 970-356-4015 x2801 |
| Yuma | Chad Day | 970-332-4805 |

County Sheriffs of Colorado. <http://www.csoc.org/counties.asp>. Jan 2011

Appendix F Regulatory Communication Network

| Colorado County Extension Offices Current as of October 2009 | | |
|--|----------------|---|
| Colorado County | Phone Number | Address |
| Adams | (303) 637-8100 | 9755 Henderson Road, Brighton, CO 80601 |
| Alamosa | (719) 852-7381 | 1899 E. Hwy 160, Monte Vista, CO 81144 |
| Arapahoe | (303) 730-1920 | 5804 South Datura, St. Littleton, CO 80120 |
| Archuleta | (970) 264-5931 | 344 Highway 84, Pagosa Springs, CO 81147 |
| Baca | (719) 523-6971 | 772 Colorado St., Springfield, CO 81073 |
| Bent | (719) 456-0764 | 1499 Ambassador Thompson BLVD, Las Animas, Co 81054 |
| Boulder | (303) 678-6238 | 9595 Nelson Road, Longmont, CO 80501 |
| Broomfield | (720) 887-2286 | 6650 W. 120th Ave., Broomfield, CO 80020 |
| Chaffee | (719) 539-6447 | 10165 County Road 120, Salida, CO 81201 |
| Cheyenne | (719) 767-5716 | 425 South 7th W., Cheyenne Wells, CO 80810 |
| Conejos | (719) 852-7381 | 1899 E. Hwy 160, Monte Vista, CO 81144 |
| Costilla | (719) 852-7381 | 1899 E. Hwy 160, Monte Vista, CO 81144 |
| Crowley | (719) 267-5243 | 601 North Main Street, Ordway, CO 81063 |
| Custer | (719) 783-2514 | 205 South 6 th , Westcliffe, CO 81252 |
| Delta | (970) 874-2195 | 525 Dodge Street, Delta, CO 81416 |
| Denver | (720) 913-5270 | 888 E. Iliff Avenue, Denver, CO 80210 |
| Dolores | (970) 677-2283 | 409 North Main Street, c/o Courthouse, Dove Creek, CO 81324 |
| Douglas | (720) 733-6930 | 410 Fairgrounds Road, Castle Rock, CO 80104 |
| Eagle | (970) 328-8630 | 441 Broadway, Eagle CO 81631 |
| El Paso | (719) 520-7675 | 305 South Union Blvd., Colorado Springs, CO 80910 |
| Elbert | (719) 541-2361 | 325 Pueblo, Simla, CO 80835 |
| Elbert Branch Office | (303) 621-3162 | P.O. Box 189, Kiowa, CO 80117 |
| Fremont | (719) 276-7390 | 615 Macon Avenue, Canon City, CO 81212 |
| Garfield | (970) 625-3969 | Fairgrounds, 1001 Railroad Avenue, Rifle, CO 81650 |

Colorado State University Extension, <http://www.ext.colostate.edu/cedirectory/countylist.cfm> Oct. 2009

Appendix F Regulatory Communication Network

| Colorado County Extension Offices Current as of October 2009 | | |
|--|----------------|---|
| Colorado County | Phone Number | Address |
| Gilpin | (303) 582-9106 | 230 Norton Drive, Blackhawk, CO 80422 |
| Grand | (970) 724-3436 | 210 11th Street, Extension Hall, Fairgrounds, Kremmling, CO 80459 |
| Gunnison | (970) 641-1260 | 275 South Spruce, Gunnison, CO 81230 |
| Huerfano | (719) 738-2170 | 928 Russell Ave, Walsenburg, CO 81089 |
| Jackson | (970) 723-4298 | 312 5th Street, Walden, CO 80480 |
| Jefferson | (303) 271-6620 | 15200 West Sixth Avenue, Golden, CO 80401 |
| Kiowa | (719) 438-5321 | County Courthouse - 1305 Goff, Eads, CO 81036 |
| Kit Carson | (719) 346-5571 | 251 16th Street, Burlington, CO 80807 |
| La Plata | (970) 247-4355 | 2500 Main Ave., Durango CO 81301 |
| Larimer | (970) 498-6000 | 1525 Blue Spruce Drive, Fort Collins, CO 80524 |
| Las Animas | (719) 846-6881 | 2200 North Linden Ave, Trinidad, CO 81082 |
| Lincoln | (719) 743-2542 | 326 8 th St., Hugo, CO 80821 |
| Logan | (970) 522-3200 | 508 South 10 th Ave, Sterling, CO 80751 |
| Mesa | (970) 244-1834 | 2775 Highway 50, Grand Junction, CO 81502 |
| Mineral | (719) 852-7381 | 1899 E. Hwy 160, Monte Vista, CO 81144 |
| Moffat | (970) 824-9180 | 539 Barclay Street, Craig CO 81625 |
| Montezuma | (970) 565-3123 | 109 West Main Street, Cortez, CO 81324 |
| Montrose | (970) 249-3935 | 1001 North 2 nd , St. Montrose, CO 81401 |
| Morgan | (970) 542-35 | 914 E. Railroad, Ave, Fort Morgan, CO 80701 |
| Otero | (719) 836-42 | 411 North 10 th St. Rocky Ford, CO 81067 |
| Park | (719) 836-4293 | 880 Bogue St. Fairplay, CO 80440 |
| Phillips | (970) 854-3616 | 127 East Denver, Holyoke, CO 80734 |
| Prowers | (719) 336-7734 | 1001 S. Main St., Pueblo, CO 81003 |
| Pueblo | (719) 583-6566 | 212 W. 12 th St. Pueblo, CO 81003 |


Colorado State University Extension, <http://www.ext.colostate.edu/cedirectory/countylist.cfm> Oct. 2009

Appendix F Regulatory Communication Network

| Colorado County Extension Offices Current as of October 2009 | | |
|--|---------------------|---|
| Colorado County | Phone Number | Address |
| Rio Blanco | (970) 878-9490 | 779 Sulphur Creek Road, Meeker, CO 81641 |
| Rio Blanco Branch Office | (970) 675-2417 | Western, Annex 17497 Highway 64, Rangely, CO 81648 |
| Rio Grande-Saguache | (719) 852-7381 | 1899 E. Hwy 160, Monte Vista CO 81144 |
| Routt | (970) 879-0825 | 136 6 th St. Steamboat Springs, CO 80477 |
| San Miguel | (970) 327-4393 | 1120 Summit, Norwood CO 81423 |
| Sedgwick | (970) 474-3479 | 315 Cedar, Julesburg, CO 80737 |
| SLV Area Office | (719) 852-7381 | 1899 E. Hwy 160 Monte Vista, CO 81144 |
| Summit | (970) 668-3595 | 37 Peak One Dr., CR1005, Frisco, CO 80443 |
| Teller | (719) 689-2552 | 112 North A St. Cripple Creek, CO 80813 |
| Washington | (970) 345-2287 | 181 Birch Avenue Akron, CO 80720 |
| Weld | (970) 304-6535 | 525 North 15 th Ave., Greeley CO 80631 |
| Yuma | (970) 332-4151 | 310 Ash Street, Wray, CO 80758 |

Colorado State University Extension, <http://www.ext.colostate.edu/cedirectory/countylist.cfm> Oct. 2009

Colorado VMO Territories



Appendix H FADI Collection Data Form Sample

Foreign Animal Investigation Disease Form

FADD Name and Phone: _____ Date: _____ FAD Control #: _____

Owner Information

Premises Information

Name: _____

Address: _____

Address: _____

City: _____

City, State, Zip: _____

State, Zip: _____

Type of Operation: _____

County: _____

Phone: _____

Latitude: _____

County: _____

Longitude: _____

Primary Species on Premises Initiating complaint: _____

Primary Species on Premises if different from above: _____

Number of animals showing lesions by species: (use separate page for additional animals or use comments lines)

| Species: | # Animals: | # Sick | Description/ID: | Samples Submitted: |
|----------|------------|--------|-----------------|--------------------|
|----------|------------|--------|-----------------|--------------------|

| | | | | |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1. _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|

| | | | | |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 2. _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|

| | | | | |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 3. _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|

| | | | | |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 4. _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|

Please describe any movements of affected animals from the premises over the past month _____

Number & type of other susceptible species on premises: _____

Private Practitioner: _____ Clinic Name: _____

Phone: _____ Cell Phone: _____

Has practitioner collected samples? Yes No If yes, what type? _____

Has FADD collected Samples: Yes No If yes, what type? _____

FedEx Tracking #: _____

What lab were samples sent to? FADDL NVSL Date Shipped: _____

Onset date: _____ Follow-up Date: _____

Quarantine date: _____ Quarantine number: _____

Count down date: _____ Quarantine release date: _____

Comments: _____

Appendix I EPA Approved Disinfectants for Highly Pathogenic Diseases

| Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Approved Disinfectants for Highly Pathogenic Diseases¹ | | | | |
|---|---|---------------------------|--|---|
| Disease | Product | EPA Regulatory No. | Manufacturer | Active Ingredient(s) |
| African Swine Fever | | | | |
| | Low Ph Phenolic 256 | 211-62 | Central Solutions, Inc | o-Phenylphenol 2-Benzyl-4- chlorophenol |
| | Pheno Cen Germicidal Detergent | 211-25 | Central Solutions, Inc | o-Phenylphenol, potassium salt p-tert-Amylphenol, potassium salt Potassium 2-benzyl- 4-chlorophenate |
| | Klor-Kleen | 71847-2 | Medentech Ltd. | Sodium dichloro-striazinetrione |
| | Virkon S | 71654-6 | DuPont Chemical Solutions Enterprise | Solutions Enterprise Sodium chloride Potassium peroxymonosulfate |
| Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera) | | | | |
| | Pheno Cen Germicidal Detergent | 211-25 | Central Solutions, Inc | o-Phenylphenol, potassium salt p-tert-Amylphenol, potassium salt Potassium 2-benzyl- 4-chlorophenate |
| | Pheno-Cen Spray Disinfectant/Deod orant | 211-32 | Central Solutions, Inc | o-Phenylphenol Ethyl alcohol |
| ¹ United States Animal Health Association, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases. <i>Foreign Animal Diseases</i> , 2008 | | | | |

Appendix I EPA Approved Disinfectants for Highly Pathogenic Diseases

| Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Approved Disinfectants for Highly Pathogenic Diseases¹ | | | | |
|---|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| Disease | Product | EPA Regulatory No. | Manufacturer | Active Ingredient(s) |
| Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera) Cont. | | | | |
| | Tri-Cen | 211-36 | Central Solutions, Inc | p-tert-Amylphenol, sodium salt Sodium 2-benzyl-4- chlorophenate Sodium o-phenylphenate |
| Foot and Mouth Disease | | | | |
| | Low pH Phenolic 256 | 211-62 | Central Solutions, Inc | 2-Benzyl-4-chlorophenol o-Phenylphenol |
| | Oxonia Active | 1677-129 | Ecolab Inc. | Peroxyacetic Acid Hydrogen peroxide |
| | Oxysept LDI | 1677-203 | Ecolab Inc. | Peroxyacetic Acid Hydrogen peroxide |
| Rinderpest | | | No products registered | |
| ¹ United States Animal Health Association, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases. <i>Foreign Animal Diseases</i> , 2008 | | | | |

Appendix J Local, State, and Federal Agencies Roles and Responsibilities

LEAD AGENCY

Colorado Department of Agriculture

The CDA, Animal Industry Division is the lead agency in any livestock health related emergency occurring in Colorado. CDA will respond by using the NIMS protocol. The specific components will be under the joint command of the State Veterinarian and the APHIS AVIC. Their overall responsibility will encompass command and management of the disease event, overseeing the management and dissemination of resources, establishing a communication and information management system and securing supporting technologies. The State Veterinarian and AVIC may use any or all of the following action steps to control and/or eradicate the disease encountered in the event.

- Assign an emergency response level to the incident.
- In consultation with the APHIS AVIC, determine the scope and level of initial response and initiate a task force.
- In consultation with the APHIS AVIC, determine the location and size of hold / quarantine areas.
- Establish quarantine area(s) and issue quarantine orders as needed.
- In consultation with the APHIS AVIC and other agency personnel, strategically assign duties and areas of responsibility to state, deputy-state and federal veterinarians, members of the Colorado veterinary response team, livestock inspectors and animal health technicians.
- Determine appropriate movement restrictions for animals, people, equipment, feed, commodities, and conveyances.
- In collaboration with the CDA, USDA – APHIS, VS, and/or the Incident Management Team and the Public Information Officer, prepare information for dissemination to the public, producers, processors and other concerned groups through the Joint Information System or Center.
- CDA will notify Colorado Division of Emergency Management (CDEM) when a swine disease sample is being sent to the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Lab (FADDL, Plum Island, NY) for analysis and is likely to be a highly contagious or infectious disease or agent of concern.
- CDA will coordinate with CDEM, USDA, Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT), Colorado State Patrol (CSP) local jurisdictions, and other agencies as needed in enforcing stop movement orders.
- Conduct livestock disease assessments at the site of the event to determine needs and priorities.
- Coordinate state-level livestock disease emergency response and recovery activities.
- Prioritize activities and areas of greatest urgency for state response and recovery personnel in the field.
- CDA will coordinate with USDA, APHIS, VS, Emergency Programs Staff and provide liaison between other federal, state and local organizations when required.
- CDA will develop protocols for worker protection related to incident-specific health and safety site plans, risk (hazard/exposure) assessments and PPE.
- Direct disease investigations, epidemiological investigations and trace outs to determine source of disease and scope of disease outbreak.

Appendix J Local, State, and Federal Agencies Roles and Responsibilities

- Identify contaminated feed, swine, and agricultural products that must be destroyed and disposed of or decontaminated.
- Identify and approve, in collaboration with CDPHE, animal carcass disposal sites.
- Identify and approve, in collaboration with CDPHE, sites for disposal of, contaminated feed, or other items that are contaminated.
- Identify and approve, in collaboration with CDPHE, temporary waste disposal sites for effluent from cleaning and disinfecting stations.
- Coordinate with appropriate organizations for the deployment of inspectors and veterinarians for agricultural response and recovery.
- Establish and/or coordinate appropriate regulatory controls.
- In collaboration with the CDA PIO provide advisories and related public information.
- CDA will coordinate with CSP, county and local law enforcement for site security and related issues.
- Maintain ongoing animal agriculture surveillance of affected communities in order to rapidly identify and address disease-related problems.
- Notify DOW of any wildlife disease threat or involvement.
- Work in close collaboration with the Colorado Brand Board and livestock industry groups as well as major swine producers

SUPPORT AGENCIES

Local Government

Since all emergency response begins at the local level, local emergency management officials will be actively involved in the response and will be a key provider of resources for operational missions. Each county has a comprehensive emergency management plan which provides the framework for the jurisdiction's response to emergencies and disasters. Counties, through their assets of County Commissioners, County Extension Offices and their networks, will utilize their resources and provide an additional line of communication with local farmers, industry groups and the community. Additionally, as part of a coordinated response, local law enforcement officers with assistance from Brand Inspectors and Bureau of Animal Protection Agents may:

- Assist in identifying clean transportations corridors' for moving unaffected livestock and animal food products safely during an animal health incident.
- Provide security in implementing a hold or quarantine for the infected area.
- Assist in the conduct of a criminal investigation
- Provide Site security and conflict resolution as needed to ensure the safety of veterinarians, inspectors, all other responders and the general public should any conflicts arise.

Appendix J Local, State, and Federal Agencies Roles and Responsibilities

State Agencies

Colorado Division of Emergency Management may:

- Activate the State Emergency Management Plan and SEOC to support CDA.
- Support CDA by providing statewide coordination for logistical support, security, biosecurity, support personnel, procurement of supplies, equipment, vehicles, food, lodging, and administrative support during livestock disease response and recovery from emergencies. Coordinate with CDA, for the provision of biosecurity training to support agencies and provide biosecurity training to agency personnel designated for operations in the affected area.

Colorado State Patrol (CSP) may:

- Provide law enforcement support and coordination to conduct traffic checkpoints and roadblocks, enforce stop movement orders and secure quarantined areas and related sites during swine disease emergencies.
- Coordinate with local law enforcement agencies to support response and recovery with all available resources.

Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment may:

- Coordinate with CDA if a zoonotic condition exists.
- Support public information efforts.
- Consult with CDA and USDA regarding bio-security issues related to zoonotic diseases.
- Provide veterinary and epizootiologic support to a CDA emergency.
- Assist and collaborate with CDA on subjects such as carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection and other issues that may influence soil, water, and air quality.
- Liaison with Environmental Protection Agency to address issues that may arise.
- Provide laboratory emergency response and/or surge support.
- Colorado Human Services Department may provide or coordinate mental health staff to assist in crisis counseling efforts.

Colorado Division of Wildlife may:

- Provide disease surveillance in free-ranging wildlife and wildlife in zoos, parks, and other natural areas.
- Survey for and/or dispose of contaminated items and wild animals.
- Conduct wild animal inventories in the area of a disease event to identify susceptible species.
- In collaboration with the State Veterinarian, collect wildlife specimens and samples for disease testing to determine presence or absence of disease or transmission of the disease agent or impact of disease on wildlife.

Appendix J Local, State, and Federal Agencies Roles and Responsibilities

Colorado Department of Transportation may:

- Assist in the movement of state resources during livestock disease emergencies.
- Provide traffic control and routing assistance, barricades, and road monitoring.
- Provide equipment and operators to assist with animal disposal.

Colorado State University (CSU) may:

- The College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences (CVMBS) may provide veterinary support and expertise throughout the emergency as requested by CDA.
- Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory may provide appropriate diagnostic support services as requested by CDA.
- Colorado State University Extension may provide, communication, and liaison between Incident Command, affected industry groups and local communities during emergencies.

Federal Agencies

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) may:

- Assist in disease eradication activities including quarantine, evaluation, indemnification, slaughter, disposal, cleaning and disinfecting, epidemiology, trace-back, vector control and transportation permitting arrangements and /or in acquiring appropriate contractors to conduct such activities.
- .
- Consult with state and local authorities regarding eradication proceedings.
- Collect, analyze, and disseminate technical and logistical information.
- Define training requirements for temporary employees or support agencies involved in eradication operations.
- Issue a declaration of extraordinary emergency.
- Coordinate with state and local agencies to define quarantine and buffer zones.
- Prepare information for dissemination to the public, producers, processors and other concerned groups through the Joint Information Center.
- Allocate funding for indemnifying to the owner(s) of depopulated animals or related property loss.
- Define restrictions on interstate commerce.

USDA, Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS)

The FSIS is charged with protecting the Nation's food supply by providing inspectors and veterinarians in meat, poultry, and egg product plants to prevent, detect, and act in response to food safety emergencies. FSIS has developed the infrastructure needed to confront new biosecurity challenges. FSIS may assist state and local authorities in disease eradication activities and/or food-borne illness emergency investigations.

Appendix J Local, State, and Federal Agencies Roles and Responsibilities

USDA, Customs and Border Protection

Shall inspect and regulate movement of at risk people, agricultural products or product containers or the likely at ports-of entry (such as Denver International Airport) to prevent, detect or act in response to agricultural emergencies.

Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

One of FDA's mandates is to protect the public health by assuring the safety of our nation's food supply. FDA also has an important role in prevention and control of contaminated animal feed. FDA may assist state and local authorities in disease eradication activities and/or food-borne illness emergency investigations.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The FBI is the agency responsible for investigating cases of bio-terrorism or agro-terrorism a part of the mission of a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). When food animals are the target of a terrorists attack and evidence suggests a foreign animal disease may have been intentionally introduced or threatened, CDA will notify the CIAC who in turn will coordinate activities with the JIFF within the Denver Office of the FBI.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

The federal agency that may collaborate with CDPHE & CDA on decisions of carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection and their effect on soil, air and water or the environment in general.

Local Livestock Industry Groups

Serve as liaison on matters relating to livestock industries affected by an animal disease outbreak.

- Identify individuals who may be qualified to assist in disease control efforts.
- Develop a list of qualified appraisers.
- Provide assistance to families affected by an animal disease outbreak.
- Provide support for disease control and eradication activities.
- Provide appropriate information for dissemination to industries and public (through close coordination with CDA or the IMT public information officer).
- Support response and recovery with all available resources.

Appendix K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

Industry will play an important role both in preventing a disease outbreak and in responding to an animal health emergency. The following Appendix offers recommendations and actions to improve Continuity of Operations plans for the swine industry. Specific material provided in this section includes the following.

Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Action Steps / Check list of FADD Information

Flow Chart of a Foreign Animal Disease Investigation

Developing a Site Plan

Biosecurity Measures for Pork Producers

List of FADs Diseases Significant to Swine

Appendix K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE INVESTIGATION ACTION STEPS

1. Contact the State Veterinarian's Office or the USDA Area Veterinarian in Charge

Colorado State Veterinarian: Keith Roehr, DVM (303) 239 - 4161
Area Veterinarian – in– Charge: Roger Perkins, DVM (303) 231 – 5385


2. The Colorado State Veterinarian or AVIC will dispatch a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to initiate an investigation within 24 hours of the initial notification.
3. The FADD will set up an appointment to visit the premises, assess the disease situation, collect and submit laboratory samples, execute disease control actions if necessary, and file a report with the State Veterinarian and AVIC.
4. The State Veterinarian and AVIC will assign a priority level to the laboratory submissions which will govern the response of the federal lab(s).
5. Further actions may be taken at the discretion of the State Veterinarian in collaboration with the AVIC and in consultation with the FADD.
6. Laboratory results will be reported to the State Veterinarian who will notify the AVIC and FADD. The FADD will then notify the practitioner and the owner.
Source: American Association of Swine Veterinarians

Information collected during a Foreign Animal Disease Investigation

- ✓ Name and Address of Owner / Manager
- ✓ Physical location of the affected premises
- ✓ Type of operation being investigated
- ✓ Number and type of animals on premises
- ✓ Movement of animals on and off premises and date of movement
- ✓ Location of animals prior to arriving on premises
- ✓ Location of animals after leaving premises
- ✓ Number of sick and dead animals
- ✓ Physical examinations of the affected animals
- ✓ Results of postmortem examinations
- ✓ Number and types of samples taken
- ✓ Name of suspected disease

Appendix K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

FLOW CHART OF FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE INVESTIGATION




Appendix K Industry’s Role in Emergency Response

DEVELOPING A SITE PLAN

In the event of a disease outbreak, the State Veterinarian will recommend biosecurity measures to assist in containing the spread of the disease agent for all premises in or near the control area. Identifying the infrastructure on your premises prior to an outbreak will assist Colorado animal health officials in developing a biosecurity plan to protect the premises. Instructions for developing a site plan are listed below. The following guidance may also be used to update and reevaluate existing site plans.

- A. Indicate geographic directionality (north, south east and west) on the Site Plan.
- B. Sketch an outline of all structures on the premises.
- C. Identify structure’s purpose—(ie. Residential house, feed storage, nursery).
- D. For structures housing animals, identify type and number of animals.
- E. Sketch and identify water sources for livestock and humans on premises.
- F. Outline all yards and pastures that animals have access to.
- G. Identify all premises’ ingresses and egresses.
- H. Identify all roads, streams or ponds on the premises.
- I. Indicate the acreage of premises.
- J. Attach aerial photos of property to sketched site plan. Area photos can be obtained for many locations at www.maps.google.com.

Site Plan Template



Appendix K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

BIOSECURITY MEASURES AND GENERAL PREVENTION PRACTICES FOR SWINE PRODUCERS

| General Precautionary Measures | | | |
|--|-----|-------------|----|
| Do you require that all individuals wash hands with soap and warm water before and after animal contact? | Yes | In Progress | No |
| Farm Entrance and Perimeter | | | |
| Do you limit access to your farm? | | | |
| Do you have only one gated entrance to the animal areas on your farm to better control and monitor visitors and vehicles? | | | |
| Do you keep the gate locked when not in use? | | | |
| Do you minimize contact between pigs and wildlife, feral pigs, and birds? | | | |
| Do you keep cats and dogs from roaming between farms? | | | |
| Do you minimize visitors and traffic on your farm? | | | |
| Do you post signs at the farm entrance to inform visitors of procedures to follow on you farm? Examples of signage includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stay off this farm unless given permission to enter - Check-in with farm personnel upon arrival (direct visitors where they should check in) - Be accompanied by someone from the farm at all times (to ensure biosecurity measures are being met - Wear clean farm-specific clothing (coveralls, boots) while on the farm - Avoid animals unless absolutely necessary | | | |
| Have you posted a visitor biosecurity sign that clearly lists specific measures to follow when on your farm? | | | |
| Do you require visitors to follow your farm's biosecurity procedures? | | | |
| Do you require visitors to check-in with farm personnel upon their arrival? | | | |
| Do you require delivery vehicles and personnel to follow your farm biosecurity guidelines regarding parking, driving and animal contact? | | | |
| Do you inspect delivery vehicles for cleanliness and restrict entry to those with visible contamination on tires, wheel wells, etc? | | | |
| Do you require feed deliveries to your farm be the first delivery of the day? | | | |
| Do you require that all deliveries be left at the perimeter of your farm? | | | |
| Are your animal load out and delivery facilities located at the perimeter of your farm? | | | |

Appendix K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

BIOSECURITY MEASURES AND GENERAL PREVENTION PRACTICES FOR SWINE PRODUCERS (CONT.)

| Employees | | | |
|---|------------|--------------------|-----------|
| | Yes | In Progress | No |
| Do you talk to your employees about the disease risks associated with owning or handling pigs outside of your operation? | | | |
| Do you require that employees that have contact with swine at other locations (including their own home) use strict biosecurity measures while on your farm (e.g. provide them with clean boots and coveralls to wear)? | | | |
| Have you educated yourself and trained your employees to recognize and report diseases? | | | |
| Do you maintain a written Biological Risk Management Plan and have regularly scheduled meetings to educate and update those involved? | | | |
| Neighbors | | | |
| Do you restrict the sharing of equipment or vehicles between farms? | | | |
| If equipment must be shared, do you remove all manure and bedding, wash the equipment with warm water and soap, rinse, disinfect and rinse again before using it with animals from your farm? | | | |
| Do you always wear clean clothes or coveralls, gloves, hats, boots, etc. when coming in contact with animals? | | | |
| After contacting your neighbors livestock, do you wash and disinfect boots, change gloves, hats, and clothes or coveralls before returning to your farm? | | | |
| Visitors and Vehicles | | | |
| Have you posted warning signs telling visitors to only enter your farm with permission? | | | |
| Do you provide a phone number at your farm entrance for visitors to call and make an appointment? | | | |
| Are all visitors accompanied by someone from the farm at all times? | | | |
| Do you use only on-farm vehicles for transporting visitors within your operation? | | | |
| Do you require visitors and vehicles to park in designated areas at the entrance to your farm and away from all animal areas? | | | |
| Do you restrict visitors from animal housing areas and from contacting or handling your pigs (unless absolutely necessary)? | | | |
| Do you provide clean coveralls and disposable or disinfected rubber boots and require that these items be worn by all visitors at all times while in animal areas? | | | |
| Do you provide facilities and equipment (pressure washers, brushes, hoses) for cleaning and disinfecting vehicles, boots, etc? | | | |

Appendix K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

BIOSECURITY MEASURES AND GENERAL PREVENTION PRACTICES FOR SWINE PRODUCERS (CONT.)

| Record Keeping | | | |
|---|------------|--------------------|-----------|
| | Yes | In Progress | No |
| Do you maintain a log sheet to record any visitors or vehicles that come onto your farm? | | | |
| Do you maintain thorough and accurate records of animal movement? | | | |
| Is each farm location treated as a separate unit? | | | |
| Animals - Animal Health | | | |
| Do you review and update your vaccination and treatment protocols with your veterinarian at least once a year? | | | |
| Do you monitor and inspect animals for signs of illness at least daily? | | | |
| Do you investigate all animals with unusual signs or those unresponsive to treatment, especially those that die suddenly? | | | |
| Do you clean equipment, boots, and change clothing when between animal groups with different health status and age? | | | |
| Do you promptly euthanize animals that are not going to recover? | | | |
| Does your veterinarian necropsy animals that die from unknown causes? | | | |
| Do you promptly remove dead animals and dispose of the carcass (e.g. render, compost, bury or burn) according to local and state laws? | | | |
| Animals - New Introductions | | | |
| Do you follow and all in/all out policy for pig barns to minimize disease introduction and allow for cleaning and disinfection ? | | | |
| Do you limit purchases to a few sources with known and trusted herd health programs? | | | |
| Do you obtain a complete herd health history prior to purchasing and introducing new animals? | | | |
| Do you request copies of vaccination and treatment records for all purchased animals? | | | |
| Animals - Isolation and Quarantine | | | |
| Are your isolation and quarantine facilities removed from all other animal areas and separate from one another ? | | | |
| Do you prevent the sharing of equipment (feed, treatment, restraint) between isolation and quarantine animals ? | | | |
| If equipment must be shared, do you wash it in warm water and soap to remove visible contamination, rinse, disinfect and rinse it again before removing it from one location and moving it to another ? | | | |
| Do you immediately isolate sick animals from the herd to minimize disease spread? | | | |
| Do you prevent direct contact between isolated animals and others? | | | |

Source: Iowa State University, The Center for Food Security and Public Health

Appendix K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

BIOSECURITY MEASURES AND GENERAL PREVENTION PRACTICES FOR SWINE PRODUCERS (CONT.)

| Animals - Isolation and Quarantine Cont. | | | |
|--|------------|--------------------|-----------|
| | Yes | In Progress | No |
| Do you prevent the sharing of ventilation, feed/water and equipment between isolated or quarantined animals and others? | | | |
| Do you use separate facilities, equipment, and staff to handle isolated livestock? | | | |
| If it is not possible to use separate facilities, equipment and staff, do you handle or visit the isolated animals LAST? | | | |
| Do you clean and disinfect all equipment, clothing, boots, etc. that come into contact with ill and isolated animals? | | | |
| Do you quarantine all animals that are recent purchases or those that return to your farm? | | | |
| Do you prevent new additions and animals returning from sharing water, feed, facilities or bedding with your other animals? | | | |
| Have you determined together with your herd veterinarian the appropriate times for animals to spend in isolation and quarantine? | | | |
| Do you test for key diseases before taking animals out of isolation or quarantine? | | | |
| Animals - Wildlife, Other | | | |
| Do you prevent your animals from having contact with free roaming animals (e.g. wildlife, feral swine, cats, dogs, etc.)? | | | |
| Do you keep farm access routes, parking areas, yards and storage areas clean and tidy to avoid attraction of birds or rodents? | | | |
| Do you minimize bird contact and nesting in your operation? | | | |
| Do you maintain a rodent control program? | | | |
| Do you secure all feed storage areas and clean up spilled feed to minimize access by pests? | | | |
| Supply Handling | | | |
| Do you always read and follow label directions for proper storage of vaccines and medications? | | | |
| Are products that do not require refrigeration properly stored in a cabinet or other enclosure to restrict access by unauthorized individuals and minimize environmental exposure? | | | |
| Do you monitor your supply refrigerator at least monthly to help ensure the products are adequately stored (36-46°F)? | | | |
| Have you worked with your veterinarian to teach proper procedures to all people who handle vaccines and medicines? | | | |

Appendix K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

BIOSECURITY MEASURES AND GENERAL PREVENTION PRACTICES FOR SWINE PRODUCERS (CONT.)

| Supply Handling Cont. | | | |
|--|------------|--------------------|-----------|
| | Yes | In Progress | No |
| Do you restrict vaccine and medicine access to only trained personnel? | | | |
| Does your personnel training include proper handling and administration of vaccines and medicines plus when to use them? | | | |
| Cleaning and Disinfection- General Recommendations | | | |
| For pigs housed on dirt flooring, do you turn over the top layer of soil to reduce the buildup of pathogens and parasites? | | | |
| Do you thoroughly clean all objects to remove any visible debris (manure, dirt, bedding) before applying a disinfectant? | | | |
| Do you always use the proper concentration of any disinfectant and mix according to the product label? | | | |
| Do you always allow a disinfection solution contact time to "sit" and work? | | | |
| Do you refer to the disinfectant label to determine the amount of contact time that is recommended? | | | |
| Conclusion | | | |
| <p>Total number of: Yes responses _____ In Progress responses _____ No responses _____</p> <p>If you have 1 or more No responses, you have identified areas for improvement on your farm. Not all questions are equal in their risk of disease transmission, so it is important to work with your veterinarian to develop a management plan addressing the biggest risks first. This will help minimize the chance of diseases entering your farm. Each farm will be unique in their ability to prevent disease transmission because management styles, herd sizes and finances vary.</p> | | | |

Appendix K Industry's Role in Emergency Response

The following table presents information on FADs that are considered highly contagious and would cause high morbidity or mortality in swine. Information presented in this table is intended to assist producers in recognizing a potential FAD agent in swine populations.

| <u>Foreign Animal Diseases Significant to Swine</u> | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---------------------------|
| Disease Agent¹ | Clinical Signs | Mode of Transmission | | Zoonotic Potential |
| African Swine Fever^{2,3} | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High Fever - Decreased Appetite - Weakness - Reddened blotchy skin - May have diarrhea and vomiting | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aerosol (limited) - Direct Contact * Swine-to-Swine * Semen (negligible) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Oral * Ingesting infected product - Fomites - Vectors * Ticks | None |
| Classic Swine Fever^{2,3} (Hog Cholera) May cause high morbidity and mortality with mild symptoms only. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pigs may die with no clinical signs - Fever - Cyanosis (bluish discoloration) of Ears and snout - Loss of appetite, vomiting - Inability or unwillingness to stand - Diarrhea - Coughing, nasal discharge - Abortion | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aerosol (limited) - Direct Contact * Swine-to-Swine * Semen (negligible) - Oral * Ingesting infected product | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fomites - Vectors * Flies * Mosquito - Cats & dogs can spread disease | None |
| Foot and Mouth Disease^{2,3} | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lameness - Blisters on top of foot, between Claws and on heels. - Lesions on snout - Oral lesions less commonly seen | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aerosol Direct Contact * Swine-to-Swine * Semen (negligible) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Oral * Ingesting infected product - Fomites | None |
| Rinderpest^{2,3} European Swine- mild symptoms Asian Swine-high mortality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Onset of a rapidly mounting fever - Depression, - Loss of appetite, - Watery discharges from the eyes and nose - Constipation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aerosol (limited) - Direct Contact * Swine-to-Swine * Semen | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Oral * Ingesting infected product - Fomites (limited) | None |
| ¹ Listed by USDA as a FAD, FADD must conduct an investigation | | | | |
| ² AUSVETPLAN Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, Disease Strategies, http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/aahc/programs/eadp/ausvetplan/disease-strategies.cfm | | | | |
| ³ United States Animal Health Association, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases. <i>Foreign Animal Diseases</i> , 2008 | | | | |



Ready Reference Guide to Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Response and Emergency Vaccination Strategies



Introduction to FMD Emergency Vaccination

The use of emergency vaccination strategies may be considered in an FMD outbreak. An emergency vaccination strategy can help to achieve the goals of an FMD response effort, and is founded upon the three epidemiological principles of response. In order to be effective, vaccines used in emergency vaccination must be matched to a specific serotype, and ideally matched with the field strain causing the outbreak. There are many challenges to using emergency vaccination in an FMD response, but also many benefits. An FMD response may use one strategy or a variety of strategies in order to detect, control, contain, and ultimately eradicate FMD in domestic animals. The use of emergency vaccination will be determined by the Unified Command Incident Commander, the State Animal Health Official(s), and the Veterinary Services Deputy Administrator (United States Chief Veterinary Officer).

Three Epidemiological Principles of Response

1. Prevent contact between FMD virus and susceptible animals.
2. Stop the production of FMD virus in infected or exposed animals.
3. Increase the disease resistance of susceptible animals to the FMD virus or reduce the shedding of the FMD virus in infected or exposed animals.

Goals of an FMD Response

The goals of an FMD Response are to (1) detect, control, and contain FMD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate FMD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and protect public health; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.

For more information, please go to:

<https://fadprep.lmi.org> (request username and password), or
<http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml> (for APHIS employees).

Factors Influencing FMD Response Strategies

Many factors will be considered when determining whether a particular response strategy would be appropriate and advantageous. While no factor will independently dictate a response strategy, or a decision to employ emergency vaccination, there are many factors that will influence the decision of whether to vaccinate or not. Factors will include

- Disruptions to interstate commerce
- Disruptions to international trade
- Acceptance of response strategy or strategies
- Scale of outbreak
- Rate of outbreak spread
- FMD vaccine availability
- Resources available to implement response strategies

Control and Eradication Strategies for FMD

- 1. Stamping-Out.** Depopulation of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals.
- 2. Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter.** Depopulation of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals. Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter can be:
 - a. Delayed depopulation and disposal of vaccinated animals.
 - b. Slaughter of vaccinated animals, if animals are eligible for slaughter under USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) authority and rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules.
- 3. Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live.** Depopulation of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, without subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals. Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live can be:
 - a. Vaccinated animals intended for slaughter can go to slaughter, if animals are eligible for slaughter under USDA FSIS authority and rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules.
 - b. Vaccinated animals intended for breeding, milking, or other purposes can live out their useful lives.
- 4. Emergency Vaccination to Live Without Stamping-Out.** Vaccination used without depopulation of infected animals or subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals. This can be described as emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out.

Stamping-Out: This has been a commonly used approach in past FMD outbreaks occurring in countries that were previously free of FMD. This strategy is most appropriate if the outbreak is contained to a jurisdictional area or a region in which FMD can be readily contained and further dissemination of the virus is unlikely.

Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter: This is a suppressive emergency vaccination strategy, where the goal is to suppress virus replication in high-risk susceptible animals by using emergency vaccination and then slaughtering vaccinates at a later date. This is the targeted vaccination of high-risk susceptible animals.

Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live: This is a protective emergency vaccination strategy, where the goal is to protect susceptible animals from infection using emergency vaccination with the deliberate intent to maintain vaccinates for the duration of their usefulness. This is the targeted vaccination of non-infected animals, and may include the vaccination of valuable genetic stock, long-lived production animals, or areas with a high-population density.

Emergency Vaccination to Live Without Stamping-Out: This is a protective emergency vaccination strategy, where the goal is to protect susceptible animals. This strategy is reserved for an FMD outbreak in which FMD is widely disseminated across the United States.


Overview of Phases and Types of FMD Outbreaks

An FMD outbreak in the United States will be a complex event. Having pre-defined phases and potential types of an FMD outbreak may be useful to facilitate the development of adaptable emergency response plans and processes. This information is intended to be guidance, acknowledging that any FMD outbreak will be unique and responders will need to tailor the response accordingly. The phase and the type of the FMD outbreak will change over the course of the outbreak.

Phase: A temporal stage in FMD outbreak response.


Type: A categorical measure of magnitude of an FMD outbreak.

Six Types of FMD Outbreaks



This proposed typology of an FMD outbreak was developed by Dr. Jim Roth, of the Center for Food Security and Public Health, Iowa State University, as part of the Secure Milk Supply efforts. It is one approach to describing a response to an FMD outbreak in the United States.

Phases of FMD Response



Factors Influencing the Decision Whether to Use Emergency Vaccination

| Factor or criterion supporting... | Strategy | | | |
|---|---|---|--|---|
| | Stamping-out | Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter | Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live | Emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out |
| Suitable vaccine for FMD outbreak strain | Not available/feasible | Available | Available | Available |
| Resources for stamping-out (such as disposal) | Adequate | Adequate | Limited | Limited |
| Resources for vaccination (such as diagnostic testing, tracing efforts, and permitting activities) | Limited | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate |
| Population density of susceptible animals at high risk of becoming infected | Low | High | High | High |
| Population density of virus amplifying animals | Low | Moderate | High | High |
| Movement of infected animals, products, or fomites out of Control Area | No evidence of extensive movement | Evidence of extensive movement | Evidence of extensive movement | Evidence of extensive movement |
| Origin of outbreak | Known | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown |
| Location of initial outbreak | Isolated premises | Livestock producing area | Livestock producing area | Livestock producing area |
| Spread of outbreak | Slow | Rapid | Rapid | Rapid |
| Distribution of outbreak | Limited or restricted | Widespread | Widespread | Widespread |
| Risk of infection in valuable, rare, endangered, or high-value genetic livestock | High | High | Moderate | Low |
| Likelihood that FMD could become prevalent in feral swine, deer, or other wildlife | High | High | Moderate | Low |
| Public acceptance of stamping-out strategy | Neutral reaction or weak opposition | Weak opposition | Strong opposition | Strong opposition |
| Surveillance, diagnostic, and laboratory resources for serosurveillance after vaccination | Limited | Limited | Available | Available |
| Domestic stakeholders' acceptance of regionalization with vaccination to live or vaccination to slaughter | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Third-country acceptance of regionalization with vaccination to slaughter | N/A | Accepted | N/A | N/A |
| Third-country acceptance of regionalization with vaccination to live | N/A | Not Accepted | Accepted | Accepted |
| Assessments and economic analysis of competing control strategies (particularly for producers) | It is likely that a control strategy without stamping-out will lead to significantly higher economic losses, or longer duration of the outbreak | It is likely that a control strategy without stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter will lead to significantly higher economic losses or longer duration of the outbreak | It is likely that a control strategy without stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live will lead to significantly higher economic losses or longer duration of the outbreak | It is likely that a control strategy without emergency vaccination to live will lead to significantly higher economic losses or longer duration of the outbreak |
| Impact of vaccination on food supply | Significant negative impact | Neutral impact | Neutral impact | Neutral impact |

Critical Tools and Activities for Containment, Control, and Eradication

In order to achieve the goals of an FMD response, critical tools and activities must be implemented to execute and support the response strategy. These tools and activities must support a science- and risk-based approach that protects public and animal health and stabilizes animal agriculture. Here are some of the critical activities which will be employed:


- Rapid diagnosis and reporting
- Swift imposition of effective quarantine
- Epidemiological investigation and tracing
- Movement controls
- Increased surveillance
- Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal products
- Biosecurity measures
- Mass depopulation and euthanasia, potentially including preemptive culling
- Effective and appropriate disposal procedures
- Cleaning and disinfection measures
- Emergency vaccination (as the response strategy indicates).

Communication and Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign

Regardless of the response strategy or strategies selected, a public awareness campaign must be coordinated. This will support the response strategy by


- Engaging and leveraging Federal, State, Tribal, local, and stakeholder relationships to provide unified public messages for local, national, and international audiences;
- Addressing the issues and concerns relating to food safety, public health, and animal welfare;
- Addressing issues and concerns related to interstate commerce, continuity of business, and international trade; and
- Wide dissemination of key communication messages to consumers and producers.

Critical Activities in the First 72 Hours of U.S. FMD Outbreak




Overview of Vaccinated Premises and Information about FMD Vaccines

Containment Vaccination Zone



Protection Vaccination Zone



Vaccinated Premises

This is a premises where emergency vaccination has been performed. This may be a secondary premises designation. A Vaccinated Premises (VP) may be in either a Containment Vaccination Zone (CVZ) or a Protection Vaccination Zone (PVZ).

- ### Movement Control for Vaccinated Premises
- VP will be subject to any risk assessment, surveillance, and biosecurity procedures and requirements established for the primary premises or zone designation.
 - Animals receiving emergency vaccination on VP may be subject to vaccinated animal identification and differentiation of infected and vaccinated animals (DIVA) testing.
 - Primary premises designations will be used for moving animals and items into, within, or out of a PVZ or CVZ.


- ### Information about FMD Vaccines
- There are 7 serotypes (O, A, C, Asia 1, SAT-1, SAT-2, SAT-3) and approximately 65 strains; there is no cross-protection between serotypes and protection between strains varies based on antigenic similarity.
 - There are both conventional vaccines and emergency vaccines; conventional vaccines are typically used for controlling FMD in endemic areas.
 - There are two types of adjuvants:
 - Aluminum hydroxide adjuvanted FMD vaccines: work well in cattle, sheep, goats, but poorly in pigs; and
 - Oil-adjuvanted FMD vaccines: use in any species, may have longer duration of immunity, less interference from maternal antibodies, better shelf-life.
 - Non-commercial vaccine banks can be activated in emergencies. The United States participates in the North American FMD Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB) with Canada and Mexico.
 - Vaccine banks store concentrated antigens.
 - Can only store a limited number of serotypes and strains.
 - Must be finished into complete vaccines in the event of an outbreak.
 - Are more potent than commercially available, conventional vaccines.
 - Duration of immunity depends on type of vaccine used and varies by animal species. No single dose of vaccine provides “sterilizing immunity” which will prevent all future infections.



Emergency Vaccination in Infected Zone




Emergency Vaccination in Buffer Zone



Emergency Vaccination in Control Area



Emergency Vaccination Partial BZ and IZ



Infected Zone
 Buffer Zone
 Vaccination Zone
 Surveillance Zone

Containment Vaccination Zone


A Containment Vaccination Zone (CVZ) is typically a zone within the Control Area, and may include the Infected Zone (IZ) or Buffer Zone (BZ), or a part of either the IZ or BZ. A CVZ may be a secondary zone designation.

Movement Control for Containment Vaccination Zone

- Movement control is summarized in a companion ready reference guide.
- Use primary premises designations for moving animals and items into, within, or out of a CVZ.
- Movement control must take into account state and national standards for movement.
- Movement of vaccinated animals from a CVZ must take into account any OIE standards or conditions for such movement.

Vaccination in a Containment Vaccination Zone

Vaccination will occur on a Vaccinated Premises (VP). Animals receiving emergency vaccination in a CVZ will be subject to vaccinated animal identification and DIVA testing. CVZs are typically seen with a stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter strategy. However, stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live could also be employed in a CVZ.



■ Infected Zone ■ Buffer Zone ■ Vaccination Zone ■ Surveillance Zone

Example of Protection Vaccination Zones on U.S. Map



Legend
 ■ Infected Zone (IZ)
 ■ Buffer Zone (BZ)
 ■ Protection Vaccination Zone (PVZ) (typically outside Control Area)
Control Area (CA) is IZ+BZ


Protection Vaccination Zone
 A Protection Vaccination Zone (PVZ) is typically a zone outside of the Control Area. A PVZ may be a secondary zone designation.

OIE Definition of Protection Zone
 A zone established to protect the health status of animals in a free country or free zone, from those in a country or zone of a different animal health status, using measures based on the epidemiology of the disease under consideration to prevent spread of the causative pathogenic agent into a free country or free zone. These measures may include, but are not limited to, vaccination, movement control and an intensified degree of surveillance.

Vaccination in a Protection Vaccination Zone
 Vaccination will occur on a Vaccinated Premises (VP). Animals receiving emergency vaccination in a PVZ will be subject to vaccinated animal identification and DIVA testing. PVZs are typically seen with a stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live strategy. However, stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter could also be employed in a PVZ.

- Movement Control for Protection Vaccination Zone**
- Movement control is summarized in a companion ready reference guide.
 - Use primary premises designations for moving animals and items into, within, or out of a PVZ.
 - Movement control must take into account State and national standards for movement.
 - Movement of vaccinated animals from a PVZ must take into account any OIE standards or conditions for such movement.

Example Incident Command Structure for FMD Emergency Vaccination (from California Animal Health Emergency Management System)



Example of Stamping-Out




**FMD
Outbreak
Type 3:**
Large
Regional
FMD
Outbreak

Example of Stamping-Out

This map illustrates a stamping-out strategy for controlling, containing, and eradicating FMD in the United States. This map is not prescriptive—it is only an illustration. In this example, the Infected Premises would be stamped-out, and there would be no emergency vaccination strategies employed.

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter




**FMD
Outbreak
Type 3:
Large
Regional
FMD
Outbreak**

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter

This map illustrates a stamping-out strategy, modified with vaccination to slaughter, for controlling, containing, and eradicating FMD in the United States. This map is not prescriptive—it is only an illustration. In this example, the Infected Premises would be stamped-out, and there would be emergency vaccination to slaughter within the Control Areas in Containment Vaccination Zones.

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live



**FMD
Outbreak
Type 3:
Large
Regional
FMD
Outbreak**

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live

This map illustrates a stamping-out strategy modified with emergency vaccination to live for controlling, containing, and eradicating FMD. This map is not prescriptive—it is only an illustration. In this example, the Infected Premises would be stamped-out, and there would be emergency vaccination to live outside of the Control Areas in Protection Vaccination Zones.

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter and Live




**FMD
Outbreak
Type 3:
Large
Regional
FMD
Outbreak**

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter and Emergency Vaccination to Live

This map illustrates a stamping-out strategy, modified with vaccination to slaughter **and** vaccination to live. This map is not prescriptive—it is only an illustration demonstrating the possibility of employing multiple vaccination strategies during an outbreak. In this example, the Infected Premises would be stamped-out, and there would be emergency vaccination both inside (in Containment Vaccination Zones) and outside (Protection Vaccination Zones) the Control Areas. Emergency vaccinated animals may be destined for slaughter or to live out their intended useful lives.

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Regional)



**FMD
Outbreak
Type 4:
Widespread
or National
FMD
Outbreak**

Legend


- Infected Zone (IZ)
- Buffer Zone (BZ)
- Protection Vaccination Zone (PVZ)
(typically outside Control Area)

Control Area (CA) is IZ+BZ

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Regional)

This map illustrates a stamping-out strategy, modified with emergency vaccination to live. This map is not prescriptive—it is only an illustration demonstrating the possibility of employing emergency vaccination to live in regions in the United States. In this example, the Infected Premises would be stamped-out, and there would be emergency vaccination outside (Protection Vaccination Zones) the Control Area. Emergency vaccinated animals would live out their intended useful lives.

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Large-Scale)



**FMD
Outbreak
Type 4:
Widespread
or National
FMD
Outbreak**

Legend

- Infected Zone (IZ)
- Buffer Zone (BZ)
- Protection Vaccination Zone (PVZ)
(typically outside Control Area)

Control Area (CA) is IZ+BZ

Example of Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live (Large-Scale)

This map illustrates a stamping-out strategy, modified with emergency vaccination to live. This map is not prescriptive—it is only an illustration demonstrating the possibility of employing emergency vaccination to live across the entire United States. In this example, the Infected Premises would be stamped-out, and there would be emergency vaccination outside (Protection Vaccination Zones) the Control Area. Emergency vaccinated animals would live out their intended useful lives.

Example of Emergency Vaccination to Live (no Stamping-Out)



**FMD
Outbreak
Type 4:
Widespread
or National
FMD
Outbreak**

Legend

- Infected Zone (IZ)
- Buffer Zone (BZ)
- Vaccination Zone (VZ)
(can either be Containment Vaccination Zone typically inside Control Area or Protection Vaccination Zone typically outside Control Area)

Control Area (CA) IZ+BZ

Example of Emergency Vaccination to Live (No Stamping-Out)

This map illustrates an emergency vaccination to live strategy, where there is not stamping-out on the Infected Premises. In this example, emergency vaccination to live will be employed both inside (in Containment Vaccination Zones) and outside (Protection Vaccination Zones) the Control Areas. Emergency vaccinated animals would live out their useful lives for their intended purposes.


Summary of Premises Designations

| Premises | Definition | Zone |
|--------------------------|--|---|
| Infected Premises (IP) | Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, case definition, and international standards. | Infected Zone |
| Contact Premises (CP) | Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to the Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) agent, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from Infected Premises. | Infected Zone, Buffer Zone |
| Suspect Premises (SP) | Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. This is intended to be a short-term premises designation. | Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, Surveillance Zone, Vaccination Zone |
| At-Risk Premises (ARP) | Premises with susceptible animals, but none have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk Premises seek to move susceptible animals or products within the Control Area by permit. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises. | Infected Zone, Buffer Zone |
| Monitored Premises (MP) | Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible animals or products out of the Control Area by permit. | Infected Zone, Buffer Zone |
| Free Premises (FP) | Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact or Suspect Premises. | Surveillance Zone, Free Area |
| Vaccinated Premises (VP) | Premises where emergency vaccination has been performed. This may be a secondary premises designation. | Containment Vaccination Zone, Protection Vaccination Zone |

Summary of Zone and Area Designations

| Zone/Area | Definition |
|------------------------|---|
| Infected Zone (IZ) | Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises. |
| Buffer Zone (BZ) | Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises. |
| Control Area (CA) | Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone. |
| Surveillance Zone (SZ) | Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area. |
| Free Area (FA) | Area not included in any Control Area. |
| Vaccination Zone (VZ) | Emergency Vaccination Zone classified as either a Containment Vaccination Zone (typically inside a Control Area) or a Protection Vaccination Zone (typically outside a Control Area). This may be a secondary zone designation. |

Example Zones, Areas, and Premises



Note: Figures are not to scale. The Vaccination Zone can be either a Protection Vaccination Zone or Containment Vaccination Zone.

Legend

| | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| Infected Zone | Buffer Zone | Vaccination Zone | Surveillance Zone |
|--|--|---|--|

Factors Used to Determine Control Area Size

| Factors | Additional Details |
|--|--|
| Jurisdictional areas | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness and efficiency of administration Multi-jurisdictional considerations: local, State, Tribal, and multistate |
| Physical boundaries | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Areas defined by geography Areas defined by distance between premises |
| Disease epidemiology | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reproductive rate Incubation period Ease of transmission Infectious dose Species susceptibility Modes of transmission (fecal-oral, droplet, aerosol, vectors) Survivability in the environment Ease of diagnosis (for example, no pathognomonic signs; requires diagnostic laboratory testing) Age of lesions |
| Infected Premises characteristics | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of contacts Transmission pathways and transmission risk <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Extent of animal movement » Number of animals » Species of animals » Age of animals » Movement of traffic and personnel to and from premises (fomite spread) » Biosecurity measures in place at time of outbreak |
| Contact or contiguous Premises characteristics | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number and types of premises Susceptible animal populations and population density Animal movements Movement of traffic (fomites) and personnel to and from premises (fomite spread) Biosecurity measures in place prior to outbreak |
| Environment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Types of premises in area or region Land use in area or region Susceptible wildlife and population density Wildlife as biological or mechanical vectors |
| Climate (for aerosol spread diseases) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prevailing winds Humidity |
| General area, region, or agricultural sector biosecurity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Biosecurity practices in place prior to outbreak Biosecurity practices implemented once outbreak detected |
| Number of backyard or transitional premises | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Types of premises, animal movements, and network of animal and fomite movements |
| Continuity of business | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuity of business plans and processes in place or activated at beginning of outbreak (such as surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk assessments) Permit processes, memorandums of understanding, and information management systems in place or activated at beginning of outbreak |

Minimum Sizes of Areas and Zones

| Zone or Area | Minimum Size and Details |
|-------------------|---|
| Infected Zone | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perimeter should be at least 3 km (~1.86 miles) beyond perimeters of presumptive or confirmed Infected Premises. Will depend on disease agent and epidemiological circumstances. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues. |
| Buffer Zone | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perimeter should be at least 7 km (~4.35 miles) beyond the perimeter of the Infected Zone. Width is generally not less than the minimum radius of the associated Infected Zone, but may be much larger. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues. |
| Control Area | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perimeter should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles) beyond the perimeter of the closest Infected Premises. Please see previous table for factors that influence the size of the Control Area. This area may be redefined as the outbreak continues. |
| Surveillance Zone | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Width should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles), but may be much larger. |



Movement Control in a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak

Infected, Contact, and Suspect Premises are Subject to Individual Premises Quarantines

At-Risk and Monitored Premises are Subject to Movement Restrictions



Movement into Control Area from Outside Control Area to Specific Premises^a

| Item Moving into a Control Area to a/an... | Infected Premises | Suspect Premises [^] | Contact Premises [^] | At-Risk Premises | Monitored Premises |
|--|---|--|--|---|--|
| Susceptible livestock or poultry | Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the Incident Command Post (ICP), such as slaughter. | Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the ICP, such as slaughter. | Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the ICP, such as slaughter. | Permit for movement must be approved by the ICP with appropriate biosecurity measures. | Permit for movement must be approved by the ICP with appropriate biosecurity measures. |
| Susceptible animal products | See disease specific or continuity of business plans for information on susceptible animal products. | | | | |
| Other animals (non-susceptible livestock or poultry) from premises with susceptible species | Prohibited unless permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Prohibited unless permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Prohibited unless permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. ICP may require a permit for movement depending upon foreign animal disease (FAD) and characteristics of destination premises. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. ICP may require a permit for movement depending upon FAD and characteristics of destination premises. |
| Other animals or animal products (non-susceptible livestock or poultry/ products) from premises without susceptible species | ICP will determine movement restrictions based on FAD and characteristics of destination premises. | ICP will determine movement restrictions based on FAD and characteristics of destination premises. | ICP will determine movement restrictions based on FAD and characteristics of destination premises. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. ICP may require a permit for movement depending upon FAD and characteristics of destination premises. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. ICP may require a permit for movement depending upon FAD and characteristics of destination premises. |
| Equipment, vehicles, and other fomites from premises with susceptible species | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. |
| Semen, embryos from susceptible livestock or poultry | Prohibited. | Prohibited. | Prohibited. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. |

^a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

[^] Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.

Movement within a Control Area^a

| Item Moving within a Control Area from a/an... | Infected Premises | Suspect Premises [^] | Contact Premises [^] | At-Risk Premises | Monitored Premises |
|--|--|---|---|---|---|
| Susceptible livestock or poultry | Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the ICP, such as slaughter. | Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the ICP, such as slaughter. | Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the ICP, such as slaughter. | Allowed to move by permit approved by the ICP; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit. | Allowed to move by permit approved by the ICP; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit. |
| Susceptible animal products | See disease specific or continuity of business plans for information on susceptible animal products. | | | | |
| Other animals (non-susceptible livestock or poultry) from premises with susceptible species | Prohibited unless specific permit granted by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Prohibited unless specific permit granted by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Prohibited unless specific permit granted by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed to move by permit approved by the ICP; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit. | Allowed to move by permit approved by the ICP; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit. |
| Other animals or animal products (non-susceptible livestock or poultry/ products) from premises without susceptible species | n/a (Infected Premises have susceptible species) | n/a (Suspect Premises have susceptible species) | n/a (Contact Premises have susceptible species) | n/a (At-Risk Premises have susceptible species) | n/a (Monitored Premises have susceptible species) |
| Equipment, vehicles, and other fomites from premises with susceptible species | Prohibited unless specific permit granted by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Prohibited unless specific permit granted by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Prohibited unless specific permit granted by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed by permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed by permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. |
| Semen, embryos from susceptible livestock or poultry | Prohibited. | Prohibited. | Prohibited. | Allowed by permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed by permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. |

^a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

[^] Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.

Movement from inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area from Specific Premises^a

| Item Moving out of a Control Area from a/an... | Infected Premises | Suspect Premises [^] | Contact Premises [^] | At-Risk Premises | Monitored Premises* |
|--|---|---|---|--|--|
| Susceptible livestock or poultry | Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the ICP. | Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the ICP. | Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the ICP. | At-Risk Premises must become Monitored Premises to move susceptible livestock or poultry out of a Control Area. | Allowed to move by permit approved by ICP; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit. |
| Susceptible animal products | See disease specific or continuity of business plans for information on susceptible animal products. | | | | |
| Other animals (non-susceptible livestock or poultry) from premises with susceptible species | Prohibited unless specific permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures and risk-assessment. | Prohibited unless specific permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures and risk-assessment. | Prohibited unless specific permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures and risk-assessment. | Allowed to move by permit approved by ICP; surveillance and negative diagnostic tests for susceptible animals on premises, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit. | Allowed to move by permit approved by ICP; surveillance and negative diagnostic tests for susceptible animals on premises, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit. |
| Other animals or animal products (non-susceptible livestock or poultry/ products) from premises without susceptible species | n/a (Infected Premises have susceptible species) | n/a (Suspect Premises have susceptible species) | n/a (Contact Premises have susceptible species) | n/a (At-Risk Premises have susceptible species) | n/a (Monitored Premises have susceptible species) |
| Equipment, vehicles, and other fomites from premises with susceptible species | Prohibited unless permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Prohibited unless permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Prohibited unless permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed by permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. | Allowed by permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. |
| Semen, embryos from susceptible livestock or poultry | Prohibited. | Prohibited. | Prohibited. | At-Risk Premises must become Monitored Premises to move semen, embryos from susceptible livestock or poultry out of a Control Area. | Monitored Premises only allowed by permit approved by ICP and appropriate biosecurity measures. |

^a Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

[^] Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.

* Continuity of business plans may apply.

